The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. — On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a know-how (...) instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated. (shrink)

Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility - Intrinsicness - Cause and Essence - Advertisement for a Sketch of an Outline of a Prototheory of Causation - Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? - Apriority and Existence - Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism - Abstract Objects: A Case Study - The Myth of the Seven - Carving Content at the Joints - Non-Catastrophic Presupposition Failure - Must Existence-Questions Have Answers?

In Devitt’s view, linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production of products, most often one’s own. They result frorn ordinary empirical investigation, so “they are immediate and fairly unreflectiveernpirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena”, which reactions are, moreover, theory-laden, where the ‘theory’ encompasses all sorts of speaker’s beliefs. The paper reconstructs his arguments, places his view on a map of alternative approaches to intuitions, and offers a defense of a minimalistic “voice-of-competence” view. First, intuitions are to be identified with the (...) data, the minimal “products” of tentative linguistic production of naïve speaker-listeners, and not with their opinions about the data. Second, the data involve no theory and very little prototheory. Third, although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by linguists. Finally, mere acceptance of the “voice of competence” does not land us in any objectionable Cartesianism: it is cornpatible with naturalism and with distrust of a priori philosophy. (shrink)

In Devitt’s view, linguistic intuitions are opinions about linguistic production of products, most often one’s own. They result frorn ordinary empirical investigation, so “they are immediate and fairly unreflectiveernpirical central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena”, which reactions are, moreover, theory-laden, where the ‘theory’ encompasses all sorts of speaker’s beliefs. The paper reconstructs his arguments, places his view on a map of alternative approaches to intuitions, and offers a defense of a minimalistic “voice-of-competence” view. First, intuitions are to be identified with the (...) data, the minimal “products” of tentative linguistic production of naïve speaker-listeners, and not with their opinions about the data. Second, the data involve no theory and very little prototheory. Third, although there might be admixtures of guesswork in the conscious production of data, these are routinely weaned out by linguists. Finally, mere acceptance of the “voice of competence” does not land us in any objectionable Cartesianism: it is cornpatible with naturalism and with distrust of a priori philosophy. (shrink)

Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a (...) specific analysis of commonsense psychology, I want to challenge a key implication of the 'folk-theory-theory' assumption to the effect that commonsense psychology is committed to a definite architecture of the mind. (shrink)

For understanding human action rationality is a fundamental poin of point. A prototheory of social science elaborate the types of social action under the conceptualization of rationalization and human freedom in societies. On this way it must be distinguished two - not interchangeable - concepts of rationalization: the rationality of purpose e.g. the rational choice of means (Zweckrationalität) and the rationality of understanding (Verständigungsrationalität). Language behaviour has for this conceptualization the status of the frametheory. But actions are not identical (...) with language behaviour and are based on language external ressources. The conceptualizations of concepts of rationality are basic-assumptions for the construction of a structure-model of societal rationalization. (shrink)

Protoscience and Reconstruction. A central concept of the constructivist philosophy of science is the term 'protoscience'. From an orthodox point of view, protosciences are bound to give the so called 'measurement-theoretical Apriori' ('meßtheoretisches Apriori') for a science. Protophysics for example (operationally) defines the quantities 'length', 'time', and 'mass'. Thereby it yields some basic physical laws, which usually are regarded as "laws of nature", but in fact follow already from the definitions of the basic quantities. The attempt to establish other protodisciplines (...) than protophysics is traditionally regarded as not very promising, because other sciences do not like physics build their main theories on certain basic quantities. Nevertheless such enterprises like "protochemistry", "protobiology" and "protopsychology" recently appeared on the scene. Does this mark a breakthrough in constructivist philosophy of science or is this multiplication of protosciences no more than a promotion strategy? In the article it is shown that the orthodox definition of 'protoscience' is in fact far to narrow. An alternative definition is proposed which on one hand preserves the classic tasks of protophysics but on the other hand allows for other protosciences as equally useful enterprises. A central concept within the complex topic "protoscience" is the one of 'reconstruction'. It can be shown that there is a certain ambiguity in the use of this critical concept. Therefore the article ends with a reconstruction of the term 'reconstruction'. (shrink)