Le but de cet article est de démontrer que l’étymologie faisait intégralement partie de la théologie stoïcienne. Suivant leur conception panthéiste et hylozoiste du cosmos, les stoïciens utilisaient l’étymologie pour découvir diverses manifestations de Dieu dans l’univers. Ainsi, la thèse principale de cet article est de montrer que, dans le stoïcisme, l’étymologie était moins une étude sur l’histoire des mots que l’étude de la façon dont Dieu se développe et se manifeste à travers divers phénomènes de notre monde. Attendu que (...) pour les stoïciens le fait d’étudier les noms des dieux équivalait à rechercher Dieu, l’étymologie jouait un triple rôle : premièrement, elle était un moyen de rendre un culte à Dieu; deuxièmement, elle était une manière d’interpréter la poésie; et, enfin, elle était un outil de transformation de sa propre existence. Par conséquent, cet article se veut une recherche sur la dimension théologique, allégorique et existentielle de l’étymologie stoïcienne. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Aristotle’s distinction between primary substances and their homonyms. It is shown that the Stagirite regards both body parts and artefacts as mere homonyms of primary substances when they are no longer capable of performing their function (ergon) and actualizing their end (telos). In the course of the present discussion, Aristotle’s approach is confronted with his famous doctrine of the four causes, whilst an analysis of the examples given by the Stagirite serves the (...) purpose of determining the ontic status of homonyms. Subsequently, this paper argues that Aristotle’s hylomorphism not only defies the functionalist assumption of the irrelevance of matter but also precludes the possibility of equating artefacts with living organisms. The discussion concludes with an observation that primary substances which are truly (alēthōs) and things which are only homonymously (plēn homōnymōs) require different definitions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of Democritus’ allegoresis. The question whether Democritus practised allegoresis is usually answered affirmatively. Thus, for example, Jean Pépin, in his classic work on the development of allegorical interpretation, forcefully asserts that ‘Démocrite pratiqua d'abord une allégorie physique’ and that ‘il poursuivit aussi l'allégorie psychologique’. In one way or another, this view has been embraced by Luc Brisson, Ilaria Ramelli, Ilaria Ramelli and Giulio Lucchetta, Gerard Naddaf, to name just a few scholars who have recently examined (...) the issue. However, those who find allegoresis in Democritus are often somewhat perplexed at what they discover. For instance Naddaf, in his otherwise excellent study, assumes that ‘Democritus believed that Homer was indeed a visionary sage with a privileged utterance that he intentionally transmitted allegorically’, upon which he concludes that Democritus’ position is ‘inconsistent and disconcerting given his place in the pantheon of Ionian rationalism’. This shows that the claim that Democritus practised allegoresis stumbles upon the following problem: if Democritus was a rationalist, then the question arises how his rationalism can be reconciled with his alleged belief that Homer deliberately disguised his poems as allegorical prefigurations of various Democritean views. Indeed, one may legitimately ask how rational it would be on Democritus’ part to ascribe to Homer the intention of being interpreted as a precursor of atomist philosophy. The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on this conundrum and to offer a reconsideration of certain accounts that have been suggested so far. (shrink)

In theCommentary on the Cratylus, Proclus puts forward an original but largely ignored interpretation of Circe as weaving life inτῷ τετραστοίχῳ. This paper argues thatτὸ τετράστοιχονrefers not to the four genera but to the four elements. Thus what the enchantress weaves are the elemental garments that weigh the soul down to the earthly realm of mortals.