Neste artigo, busco elementos conceituais presentes em O Segundo Sexo para a formulação de uma teoria da consciência propriamente beauvoiriana. A sua própria teoria da consciência foi, pode-se dizer, ofuscada teoricamente pelas teses de grandes autores como Sartre, Merleau-Ponty e mesmo Bergson. É claro que não é possível dissociá-los por completo do pensamento de Beauvoir. Apesar disso, pretendo rastrear os elementos conceituais próprios da fenomenologia de Beauvoir. Se há uma teoria da consciência especificamente beauvoiriana ela só pode ser caracterizada a (...) partir de conceitos que compõem a sua análise da condição existencial da mulher, isto é, conceitos como os de socialização e de eterno feminino. Com esses termos técnicos, Beauvoir fundamenta a sua crítica à pretensa impessoalidade fenomenológica que pode ser reconstituída até a fenomenologia clássica de Husserl. Não há, portanto, como pensar uma teoria da consciência satisfatória, sem considerar a desproporcionalidade entre mulheres e homens, no que se refere à constituição da consciência de si. (shrink)

This essay deals with metaphilosophical issues, i.e., different ways of “doing philosophy” and their possible applications for the formulation of a properly Brazilian philosophy. The arguments are drawn from questions that constitute the instigating and pertinent book by Gonçalo Palácios entitled De como fazer filosofia sem ser grego, estar morto ou ser gênio. In order to problematize the increasingly explored question of whether there is a Brazilian philosophy, firstly, I interact with some problems raised in the mentioned work, such as (...) academic philosophical practice, its attachment to the exegesis of works consecrated by tradition, and the consequent subdivision between history of philosophy and “philosophizing” through specific problems of national reality. Next, I articulate some elements that allow us to characterize a specifically Brazilian philosophy. To carry out this characterization, it is essential to critically articulate the relationship between philosophy teaching, in both school and academic level, with the philosophical tradition and its adjacent concepts. (shrink)

This paper presents philosophical conditions for the foundation of a specifically Husserlian aesthetic. Therefore, will be at first considered philosophical equivalences of two modalities of conscious experience: phenomenological and aesthetic. Thereafter, we highlight some of the concepts that guide Husserlian phenomenology as perception, intuitive experience, imagination and image consciousness. We present a conceptual approach of phenomenological experience as an experience of immediate awareness that has in perception the privileged path to access data originating from intentional objects. Aesthetics experience as a (...) specific type of perception and loss, becomes a modality of phenomenological experience, insofar as it integrates, in itself, the same subject and object in a relationship properly intentional experience, functioning as a perfect paradigm of phenomenological perception opposed to naturalized experience model. Both aesthetics and phenomenology make it possible to centralize conscious experience in relation to world-consciousness, much more than the objective characterization of the world or any purely psychological facts. In both philosophical fields, imagination has a prominent status. (shrink)