In this paper, we are concerned with the preorderings (SS) and (BC) induced in the set of players of a simple game by the Shapley–Shubik and the Banzhaf–Coleman's indices, respectively. Our main result is a generalization of Tomiyama's 1987 result on ordinal power equivalence in simple games; more precisely, we obtain a characterization of the simple games for which the (SS) and the (BC) preorderings coincide with the desirability preordering (T), a concept introduced by Isbell (1958), and recently reconsidered by (...) Taylor (1995): this happens if and only if the game is swap robust, a concept introduced by Taylor and Zwicker (1993). Since any weighted majority game is swap robust, our result is therefore a generalization of Tomiyama's. Other results obtained in this paper say that the desirability relation keeps itself in all the veto-holder extensions of any simple game, and so does the (SS) preordering in all the veto-holder extensions of any swap robust simple game. (shrink)

The central concern of this paper is to prove that Blake and Wordsworth, in spite of some revealing differences between them, essentially share the same world view. Before showing how this works, we first of all should discuss, however briefly, the main difference between them.The main difference between Blake and Wordsworth is perhaps discernible in the way they respond to Nature or the physical frame of things. Here, their remarks on each other would be quite illuminating. Though there is no (...) evidence that they knew each other personally, there is concrete proof that they read some of one another's works and even commented on them. Three sources immediately come to mind in this regard: first, there is Samuel Palmer's anecdote that Wordsworth borrowed a copy of Blake's Songs of Innocence and of Experience from a friend that “he read and read and took … home to read again”; second, we have Blake's 1826 annotations to the poems of Wordsworth contained in Keynes' Nonesuch Edition of Blake; third, there is Henry Crabb Robinson's Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence. (shrink)

An expanded conceptualization of the dialogal research methodology was used to gain a deeper understanding of the dyadic experience of Being a couple. Twenty-two committed couples from a variety of backgrounds were interviewed, responding to the question: “What does it mean to ‘Be’ a couple?” The interviews were videotaped, allowing the researchers to engage with both verbal and nonverbal interpersonal expression. The authors describe the dialogal process used, and identify and discuss three core themes expressed by the couples regarding the (...) meaning of being a couple: commitment, morphogenesis, and transcending paradox through witness. (shrink)

We study political influence in institutions where each member chooses a level of support for a collective goal. These individual choices determine the degree to which the goal is reached. Influence is assessed by newly defined binary relations, each of which ranks members on the basis of their relative performance at a corresponding level of participation. For institutions with three options (e.g., voting games in which each voter may vote “yes”, “abstain”, or vote “no”), we obtain three influence relations, and (...) show that their strict components may be cyclic. This latter property describes a “paradox of power” which contrasts with the transitivity of the unique influence relation of binary voting games. Weak conditions of anonymity suffice for each of these relations to be transitive. We also obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for each of these relations to be complete. Further, we characterize institutions in which the rankings induced by these relations, and the Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik power indices coincide. We argue that extending the influence relations to firms would be useful in efficiently assigning workers to different units of production. Finally, we provide applications to various forms of political and economic organizations. (shrink)

Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313–325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapley–Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a swap (...) robust simple voting game. Each possible hierarchy can be induced by a weighted voting game and we provide a constructive proof of this result. In particular, the strict hierarchy is always achievable as long as there are at least five players. (shrink)