Bribery has previously been viewed as a two-party transaction between the bribe-offerer and the bribe-taker. But there is a third party: the one who has a prior claim on the bribe-taker's loyalty. Breaking the first contract in response to the offer of a bribe is alienation of agency (a category that strictly includes bribes): alienation of agency is the additional immorality of bribery beyond any immorality of the act solicited by the bribe.

The prevailing opinion in our culture is that bribery is in principle wrong. I challenge that view and offer an analysis that suggests that bribery is a morally neutral concept. The analysis closely parallels the legal notions, suggesting that this analysis may have a firm grounding in our own tradition in spite of the prevailing views. To bribe someone is to offer something of value to another with the intent of inducing an action that is contrary to the positional duties (...) of the office or role of that other person. Whether offering or accepting a bribe is morally correct or incorrect, then, depends entirely upon whether the relevant positional duties have moral backing, all things considered. One virtue of the analysis is that it provides a definition that allows for a cross-cultural comparison that does not impose the standards of one society on those of another but allows for moral judgment. To determine whether a Japanese official has accepted a bribe, for example, one must determine the positional duties of the official as defined in that culture. The analysis also reveals why most believe bribery to be prima facie wrong. This is explained historically by the fact that the concept originally applied exclusively to positional duties in the judicial system, where all believed it to be morally unjustified to transgress duties of impartiality, etc. Finally, the analysis suggests that beliefs about the immorality of commercial bribery rest on the assumption that the positional duties of corporate managers and agents are to abide by the fictitious free-market rules and that the rules of the free market are morally justified. (shrink)

In Theory Z-style management everybody participates in corporate decision making. This more open process should give us fewer Pintos, Love Canals, and massive international payoffs as executives are forced to expose their reasoning to the moral sensibilities of the whole corporation. So far everything looks good. But we are a long way from showing that only corporations so managed can be fully moral. Yet Dwiggins seems to believe this, putting his faith in the basic goodness of the many while virtually (...) dismissing the managers as mere technicians. This is too slick; even if it describes our average corporation today, there are plenty of less radical changes which can also produce the desired moral corporation. Good leadership which acts on their commitment to improve the company is surely one historically respectable alternative; cynicism about the present crop of leaders should not distract us from investigating this route. Finally, I wonder if Dwiggins can consistently urge us to embrace a full-scale Theory Z organizational structure, given his position on the place of ethics and profitability. (shrink)

The Machiavellian model is often praised as a realistic description of modern corporate life. My analysis of Tne Prince follows Rousseau in arguing that the prince can survive and prosper most easily by creating an environment in which almost all the citizens prosper. Far from licensing unrestrained self-aggrandizement, in this model success only comes from providing real value to almost every citizen for the entire period of one's leadership.Translation from the early sixteenth to the late twentieth century is far from (...) simple; for example, the CEO is in many ways far less powerful than a Medici prince. The closest approximation is a far less bureaucratic organization with very small units possessing maximum autonomy. Also, deciding who is, and who is not, a citizen is not nearly as straightforward as it was for Machiavelli; it probably includes every stakeholder on whom the corporation has a major impact. (shrink)