We discuss three philosophically interesting epistemic peculiarities of black hole astrophysics: (1) issues concerning whether and in what sense black holes do exist; (2) how to best approach multiplicity of available definitions of black holes; (3) short (i.e., accessible within an individual human lifespan) dynamical timescales present in many of the recent, as well as prospective, observations involving black holes. In each case we argue that the prospects for our epistemic situation are optimistic.

I discuss candidates for definitions of determinism in the context of general relativistic spacetimes, and argue that a definition which does not make recourse to any particular region of spacetime should be preferred over alternatives; one such notion is discussed in detail in the light of various physical examples. The emerging picture of determinism is a pluralist one: sometimes there is no unique way of making our intuitive concept of determinism precise. Instead, what is crucial for assessment of determinism of (...) the theory are auxiliary conditions under which it counts as deterministic or indeterministic, and justification for using them in a given situation. (shrink)

Determinism fails easily if spacetimes with points removed from the spacetime manifold are taken to be physically reasonable representations of a way the world could be according to classical general relativity. I discuss a recently proposed condition for determining which spacetimes have holes—epistemic hole freeness—and show that epistemic hole freeness gives the correct verdict in some non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes with a closed subset removed, certain spacetimes with genuinely indeterministic features count as having an epistemic hole, which implies that the requirement (...) of epistemic hole freeness enforces a form of determinism, and there is a large class of spacetimes that intuitively are radically indeterministic and unphysical due to containing a hole, but are free from epistemic holes. I show that a few natural ways of remedying are not satisfactory. (shrink)

I discuss candidates for definitions of determinism in the context of general relativistic spacetimes, and argue that a definition which does not make recourse to any particular region of spacetime should be preferred over alternatives; one such notion is discussed in detail in the light of various physical examples. The emerging picture of determinism is a pluralist one: sometimes there is no unique way of making our intuitive concept of determinism precise. Instead, what is crucial for assessment of determinism of (...) the theory are auxiliary conditions under which it counts as deterministic or indeterministic, and justification for using them in a given situation. (shrink)

I discuss candidates for definitions of determinism in the context of general relativistic spacetimes, and argue that a definition which does not make recourse to any particular region of spacetime should be preferred over alternatives; one such notion is discussed in detail in the light of various physical examples. The emerging picture of determinism is a pluralist one: sometimes there is no unique way of making our intuitive concept of determinism precise. Instead, what is crucial for assessment of determinism of (...) the theory are auxiliary conditions under which it counts as deterministic or indeterministic, and justification for using them in a given situation. (shrink)

The paper compares the method of Biblical interpretation used by Erasmus of Rotterdam with the method of Socinus, raising the question of the extent to which the method outlined by Socinus in his Explicatio primae partis primi capitis Euangelii Joannis can be seen as continuous and and consonant with the method of Erasmus, and to what extent it should be seen as its rejection or modification. In addition, the essay outlines similarities and differences, with respect to both method and content, (...) between Erasmus' Adnotationes and Socinus’ Explicatio. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Capital regulations stemming from the Basel accords created incentives for banks to securitize mortgages, even risky ones; hold them at a correspondingly low Basel risk weight; or shift them off of banks' balance sheets to obtain even greater leverage. Securitization was praised by economists and regulators for dispersing risks to investors across the world, providing greater resilience to the financial system. However, since in reality banks tended to hold onto securitized assets—either on their balance sheets or off of them, (...) in off‐balance‐sheet entities—the accumulated credit risk remained with the banks, especially in the “shadow banking sector.” This explains the heightened vulnerability of the financial system to a sudden collapse. (shrink)

The inherent complexity of modern financial systems, and their basis in human behavior, make it hard to establish unequivocally the “who, what, where, when, and why” of the global financial crisis. However, after almost a decade, we know enough to discard much of what has, in the meantime, become folk wisdom about the causes of the debacle, including Wall Street bonus culture, bankers’ greed, the moral hazard of “too big to fail,” government intervention (“too much government”) and deregulation (“not enough (...) government”). While each of these factors may have played some role, the crisis can be much more accurately described as one of ignorance than malevolence. The common thread tying the emergence of the bubble to the disastrous consequences of its bursting is the misunderstanding of correlation and causation links in three key domains: economic policy, financial modeling, and the regulatory framework. These misunderstandings helped fuel the housing bubble and introduced fragility into the system, making it vulnerable to the bubble’s subsequent, unavoidable burst. (shrink)

This is an English translation of Juliusz Domański’s “Fausta Socyna Explicatio primae partis primi capitis Euangelii Ioannis i egzegeza erazmiańska,” in his "Erasmiana minora. Studia i szkice o pisarstwie filozoficznym i religijnym Erazma z Rotterdamu" (Warsaw: Instytut Tomistyczny, Instytut Filologii Klasycznej UW, 2017), 337–63. Translated with the Author’s permission. The paper compares the method of Biblical interpretation used by Erasmus of Rotterdam with the method of Socinus, raising the question of the extent to which the method outlined by Socinus (...) in his Explicatio primae partis primi capitis Euangelii Joannis can be seen as continuous and and consonant with the method of Erasmus, and to what extent it should be seen as its rejection or modification. In addition, the essay outlines similarities and differences, with respect to both method and content, between Erasmus' Adnotationes and Socinus’ Explicatio. (shrink)

Two interesting “no hole” spacetime properties, not being future nakedly singular) are unstable in the fine topology.

Taking as a background the Plato’s model of two worlds and some categories closely associated with it, the author describes three paradigms: Tradition, Reception and Renaissance. They are linked with the human condition as means by which humans, or rather: human communities try to overcome their changeable and temporal existence.

Capital regulations stemming from the Basel accords created incentives for banks to securitize mortgages, even risky ones; hold them at a correspondingly low Basel risk weight; or shift them off of banks' balance sheets to obtain even greater leverage. Securitization was praised by economists and regulators for dispersing risks to investors across the world, providing greater resilience to the financial system. However, since in reality banks tended to hold onto securitized assets—either on their balance sheets or off of them, in (...) off‐balance‐sheet entities—the accumulated credit risk remained with the banks, especially in the “shadow banking sector.” This explains the heightened vulnerability of the financial system to a sudden collapse. (shrink)