11 found
Order:
  1. Prejudice as the misattribution of salience.Jessie Munton - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):1-19.
    What does it take to be prejudiced against a particular group? And is prejudice always epistemically problematic, or are there epistemically innocent forms of prejudice? In this paper, I argue that certain important forms of prejudice can be wholly constituted by the differential accessibility of certain pieces of information. These accessibility relations constitute a salience structure. A subject is prejudiced against a particular group when their salience structure is unduly organised around that category. This is significant because it reveals that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  2. Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.
    What, if anything, is epistemically wrong with beliefs involving accurate statistical generalizations about demographic groups? This paper argues that there is a perfectly general, underappreciated epistemic flaw which affects both ethically charged and uncharged statistical generalizations. Though common to both, this flaw can also explain why demographic statistical generalizations give rise to the concerns they do. To identify this flaw, we need to distinguish between the accuracy and the projectability of statistical beliefs. Statistical beliefs are accompanied by an implicit representation (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  3. How to see invisible objects.Jessie Munton - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):343-365.
    It is an apparent truism about visual perception that we can see only what is visible to us. It is also frequently accepted that visual perception is dynamic: our visual experiences are extended through, and can evolve over time. I argue that taking the dynamism of visual experience seriously renders certain simplistic interpretations of the first claim, that a subject at a given time can see only what is visible to her at that time, false: we can be meaningfully said (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  4. Perceptual Skill And Social Structure.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):131-161.
    Visual perception relies on stored information and environmental associations to arrive at a determinate representation of the world. This opens up the disturbing possibility that our visual experiences could themselves be subject to a kind of racial bias, simply in virtue of accurately encoding previously encountered environmental regularities. This possibility raises the following question: what, if anything, is wrong with beliefs grounded upon these prejudicial experiences? They are consistent with a range of epistemic norms, including evidentialist and reliabilist standards for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  5.  95
    Visual Confidences and Direct Perceptual Justification.Jessie Munton - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):301-326.
    What kind of content must visual states have if they are to offer direct (noninferential) justification for our external world beliefs? How must they present that content if the degree of justification they provide is to reflect the nuance of our changing visual experiences? This paper offers an argument for the view that visual states comprise not only a content, but a confidence relation to that content. This confidence relation lets us explain how visual states can offer noninferential perceptual justification (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  6.  52
    Answering machines: how to (epistemically) evaluate a search engine.Jessie Munton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    We commonly evaluate search engines and the results they return, but what grounds those evaluations? One straightforward way of evaluating search engines appeals to their ability to satisfy the goals of the user. Are there, in addition, user-independent norms, that allow us to evaluate search engines in ways that may come apart from their ability to satisfy the individuals who use them? One way of grounding such norms appeals to moral or political considerations. I argue that in addition to those (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7.  65
    Visual indeterminacy and the puzzle of the speckled hen.Jessie Munton - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):643-663.
    I identify three aspects to the puzzle of the speckled hen: A general puzzle, an epistemic puzzle, and a puzzle for the representationalist. These puzzles rely on an underlying “pictorialist” assumption, that we visually perceive general, determinable properties only in virtue of determinate properties or more specific, local features of our visual experience. This assumption is mistaken: Visual perception frequently starts from a position of uncertainty, and is routinely able to acquire information about general properties in the absence of more (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8.  57
    Prejudice: A Study in Non-ideal Epistemology.Jessie Munton - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):1057-1061.
    Wouldn’t it be nice if hateful people were invariably stupid to boot, if their prejudiced attitudes could be attributed to some kind of irrationality? Tempting though this prospect is, Endre Begby warns us against it. Philosophers have tended, he writes, to assume that prejudiced beliefs are always ‘a symptom of some kind of breakdown of epistemic rationality’ (p. 2). This view is Begby's target. There can, he claims, be epistemically unimpeachable instances of prejudicial belief. That claim comes bound up with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  33
    IV—Lost in (Modal) Space: Demographic Base-Rate Neglect in the Service of Modal Knowledge.Jessie Munton - 2023 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (1):73-96.
    Are there ever good epistemic reasons to neglect base rates? Assuming an empiricist modal epistemology, I argue that we face an interesting tension between some very plausible epistemic norms: a norm requiring us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence may facilitate knowledge of the actual world, whilst inhibiting our acquisition of modal knowledge—knowledge of how things could be, but are not. The potential for this tension in our epistemic norms is a significant result in its own right. It can (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  62
    The eye's mind: Perceptual process and epistemic norms.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11.  98
    Frege, fiction and force.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3669-3692.
    Discussion of Frege’s theory of fiction has tended to focus on the problem of empty names, and has consequently missed the truly problematic aspect of the theory, Frege’s commitment to the view that even fictional sentences that contain no empty names fail to refer. That claim prima facie conflicts with his commitment to the cognitive transparency of sense, and the determination of reference by sense. Resolving this tension compels us to recognize that fiction for Frege is a special kind of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation