This article explores the question of what character relations must have before the orthodox law of obligations will describe them as ‘causal’ relations. The article does not purport to identify the metaphysical nature of ‘causation’. Instead it provides a non-reductive account of what is essential before the law has described the relation between a specific factor and the existence of a particular indivisible phenomenon as ‘causal’. Section 1 presents a simple test for this relation—an ‘extended but-for test’—that can be deployed (...) in a straightforward way without engaging with theoretically complex and often problematic accounts of causation based on the notion of sufficient sets, such as Wright’s NESS account. Section 2 demonstrates how important principles relating to the separateness of a legal entity and to legal responsibility can resolve theoretical puzzles and in turn illuminate why the orthodox law of obligations does not choose to describe as ‘causal’ a relation wider than the one identified in this article. (shrink)

Contents: LEGAL THEORY 1. Reflections on law in context / William Twining -- 2. Are omissions less culpable? / Tony Honore -- 3. Scandinavian legal realism in the law of contract / Jan Hellner -- 4. Statutes and contracts as founts of formal reasoning / Robert S. Summers -- 5. Conceptions of public policy / John Bell LEGAL HISTORY 6. Aftermath / Paul D. Carrington -- 7. The role of the judiciary: lessons from the end of empire / Robert Stevens (...) -- 8. The Origins of futures trading in the Liverpool Cotton Market COMMON LAW 9.payment undertakings / Roy Goode -- 10. Pre-contractual duties of disclosure / S.M. Waddams -- 11. Three problems with the new product liability / Jane Stapleton -- 12. Evaluating the goals of personal injury law: some empirical evidence / Donald Harris -- 13. Negligence and economic loss / John Dwyer -- 14. Libel and constitutional free speech / John Fleming -- 15. The basis of tortious liability / Peter Cane. (shrink)