In this paper I discuss Hans Blumenberg’s The Rigorism of Truth, a short polemic that criticizes Freud and Hannah Arendt for placing a misplaced faith in the liberatory potential of rational truth in moments of historical disaster. The secondary literature suggests that this piece exhibits either all the signs of a late, Romantic capitulation to the ‘need’ for myth, or Blumenberg’s failure to recognize his own faith and debts to the ‘mythology’ of reason’s emancipatory hopes. My argument hinges on the (...) claim that these readings put undue emphasis on the philosophical anthropology component of Blumenberg’s work. Instead, I offer a new reading of the essay, in keeping with an alternative reading of his theory of myth. The essay transforms, then, from a polemic regarding the need for myth, into a nuanced description of the ways in which we can overestimate our capacity to overcome it. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophies of myth of Walter Benjamin and Hans Blumenberg. It defends the thesis that both approaches to myth, despite their differences, bring the longer, more ambiguous, legacy of the history of the human species into relation with the more familiar history of logos. They do this by maintaining a distinction between myth as it probably first emerged, namely as a way of controlling human anxieties and vulnerabilities that arose as a consequence of the pragmatic, material conditions (...) of the pre-historical world, and myth as the vast array of orally transmitted traditions left to history. In the case of both thinkers, this dichotomy illuminates myth, not as one category of human expression, but as a representation of the deeper vulnerabilities experienced by human beings, and the concerted, collective attempts to overcome them. Philosophy’s task in the face of a longer, darker history of the species, is a vigilant negotiation with the human frailties that might see its work undone. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 24 The project of this paper is a reconstruction of the philosophy of Giambattista Vico via its confrontation with that of R. G. Collingwood. The aims are twofold: the first part seeks to rescue Vico’s peculiar form of what I call philosophical ‘materiality’ from the later idealist universal histories that would subsume him, while the second explores Vico’s idea of divine providence, particularly his differentiation between it and fate. Materiality and divine providence are importantly linked. I (...) argue that any ‘return’ to Vico and his interest in a philosophically charged reception history, represents a rejection of the Cartesian grounding of modern philosophy, in the name of another potentiality for philosophical reflection that is grounded in the notion of materiality and divine providence. Although unambiguously influenced by Hegelian and in particular Crocean idealism, the fundamental hopes of Collingwood’s philosophy – namely the staving off of modernity’s regression into barbarism – resonates with this Vichean potentiality. (shrink)