Most of the standard arguments against the retributive theory of punishment are hardly new. That the retributive view of punishment is but a rationalization of a primitive urge for revenge; that the retributivists, instead of providing an answer to the question about the source of our moral right to add a new evil to an already perpetrated one , simply assert dogmatically that punishment is an intrinsic good, i.e. something that needs no further moral justification; that it is impossible to (...) apply the lex talionis in practice; that the retributivist thesis that the criminal has a right to punishment is absurd, because the criminal himself would be the first to deny that he has any such right; that the retributive theory is incompatible with the claims of forgiveness and mercy; that the practical consequences of the theory are conservative, the theory itself being in fact an apology for the existing laws and the existing social order; that the Hegelian idea of punishment as a ‘negation’ or ‘annulment’ of crime is either unintelligible or essentially utilitarian in character–most of this had been said already in the last century, or even earlier. All these arguments are still in use. 1 But in recent literature–in a number of papers published in the last twenty years or so–we find a new argument against the retributive theory. It is only natural that this particular argument should not have been used earlier: methodologically it is typical of a philosophical orientation which emerged only in our century–analytical philosophy. (shrink)

The paper is a critical examination of the main attempts at a reconciliation of the two theories of legal punishment: the utilitarian and the retributive. four middle-of-the-road theories of punishment are discussed with hart's theory offering a genuine synthesis of two approaches (negative retribution and positive retribution). (edited).

In the first part of the paper I demarcate patriotism from nationalism and layout a typology of patriotism, distinguishing its types or facets in terms of the object of patriotic loyalty, reasons for it, its motive, strength, dominant vicarious feeling, and moral import. Under the last heading, I distinguish between mundane patriotism, which seeks to promote the worldly interests of the patria -- its political stability and power, economic strength, cultural vibrancy, etc. -- and a distinctively ethical type of patriotism, (...) which is concerned with the country’s moral identity and integrity. While mundane patriotism is devoid of positive moral significance, the distinctively ethical type of patriotism is, under certain fairly common circumstances, a stance we ought to adopt. In the second part, I offer several arguments for this claim, and assess their weight and scope. (shrink)