Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 110 Heft: 1 Seiten: 136-159.

How are artificial intelligence and the strong claims made by their philosophical representatives to be understood and evaluated from a Kantian perspective? Conversely, what can we learn from AI and its functions about Kantian philosophy’s claims to validity? This volume focuses on various aspects, such as the self, the spirit, self-consciousness, ethics, law, and aesthetics to answer these questions.

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change (...) of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation. (shrink)

This paper critically investigates the explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) project. I analyze the word “explain” in XAI and the theory of explanation and identify the discrepancy between the meaning of the explanation claimed to be necessary and that which is actually presented. After summarizing the history of AI related to explainability, I argue that American philosophy in the 1900s operated in the background of said history. I then extract the meaning of explanation in view of XAI, to elucidate the relationship (...) among AI, logic, and the theory of explanation. In so doing, I aim to reveal DARPA’s surreptitious definitional retreat in terms of its contents and formal fallacy of sophisma figurae dictionis, drawing from Kant’s paralogism. I conclude that this intentional fallacy preexists the XAI project and that presumptuous use of reason, which Kant criticizes, is underlying. (shrink)