There is controversy as to whether children with developmental language disorder (DLD) and those with high-functioning autism plus language impairment (HFA-LI) share similar language profiles. This study investigated the similarities and differences in the production of Chinese negative sentences by children with DLD and children with HFA-LI to provide evidence relevant to this controversy. The results reflect a general resemblance between the two groups in their lower-than-TDA (typically developing age-matched) performance. Both groups encountered difficulties in using negative (...) markers, which suggests that they might be impaired in feature agreement. Slight differences were detected between the two groups. Specifically, children with DLD experienced difficulties with the agreement on the feature [+telic] and that on the feature [+dynamic], while children with HFA-LI had difficulties with the agreement on the feature [+dynamic] and that on the feature [−dynamic]. This study supports the idea of a common symptomatology for the two disorders. More importantly, it suggests that these two disorders, DLD and HFA-LI, are not altogether the same in terms of language impairment. This paper concludes that general labels should not be simply attached to any children with language disorders. Instead, atypical language is very worthy of further analysis in the categorization of language disorders. (shrink)

In this study, we investigated the relationships between judgments of intentionality and moral evaluation in individuals with High Functioning Autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS). HFA or AS are neurodevelopmental disorders characterised by severe deficits in communication and social functioning. Impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others, are thought to be the core features of autism. Of all mental states, the concept of ‘intentional action’ (...) is particularly important. People normally distinguish between actions that are performed intentionally and those that are performed unintentionally and this distinction plays a crucial role in social understanding and moral judgment. Recently, Knobe (Analysis 63: 190–193, 2003a ), (Philosophical Psychology 16: 309–324, 2003b ) showed that people’s moral evaluations might serve as input to the process by which people intuitively arrive at the intentionality judgments. Here, by using two pairs of vignettes, the Knobe’s Harm/Help cases and Murder/Bull’s-eye cases, we showed that, as already observed in typical population, in individuals with HFA/AS judgment of intentional action is informed by the moral appreciation of the action outcome. However, the two groups differed on praise judgments and moral justifications, suggesting that these processes were poorly influenced by the agent’s psychological states. We concluded that, although under certain circumstances, individuals with HFA/AS and people with typical development have similar intuitive judgments of intentionality, over-assignment of praise judgments and the reduced use of folk-psychological concepts in moral judgment likely reflect difficulties using intentionality information for moral reasoning. (shrink)

The current study investigated the production of third-person subject and object pronouns in monolingual and bilingual children with High Functioning Autism (HFA) and typical language development (TLD). Furthermore, it evaluated the underlying linguistic and nonlinguistic prerequisites of pronoun use, by assessing the role of morpho-syntactic skills, Theory of Mind abilities, working memory and inhibition on pronoun use. A total of 85 children aged 4;6-9;2 participated in four groups: 27 children with HFA (14 monolingual (monoHFA) and 13 bilingual (...) (biHFA)), and 58 children with TLD (28 monolingual (monoTLD) and 30 bilingual (biTLD)). All children spoke Hebrew and the bilingual children spoke Russian as their Heritage Language. Third-person subject and object pronouns were elicited in Hebrew. The results yielded no effect of bilingualism and a robust effect of HFA for the use of pronouns. Bilingual Russian-Hebrew speaking children paired up with their monolingual Hebrew-speaking peers in pronominal use in Hebrew. Monolingual and bilingual children with TLD showed nearly ceiling performance on pronoun use. The facilitative effect of pronominal acquisition in Hebrew among bilingual children was attributed to similarities in the pronominal systems of the two languages of bilingual children. Age was found to be a predictive factor of pronoun use in children with TLD. Conversely, children with HFA had a lower rate of pronoun production compared to the TLD groups. Both third-person subject and object pronouns were largely predicted by morpho-syntactic abilities of children with HFA. In addition, subject pronoun use was predicted by ToM skills and working memory confirming that pronoun use is a complex phenomenon, which requires integration of multiple linguistic and nonlinguistic components. To conclude, our findings suggest that morpho-syntactic development is a prerequisite for third-person subject and object pronoun use in children with HFA, and ToM and working memory are involved in third-person subject pronoun use. In addition, we show that pronoun use is not compromised by dual language exposure in children with TLD and with HFA. (shrink)

The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to (...) distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Simon Baron-Cohen has argued that autism and related developmental disorders (sometimes called “autism spectrum conditions” or “autism spectrum disorders”) can be usefully thought of as the condition of possessing an “extreme male brain.” The impetus for regarding autism spectrum disorders (ASD) this way has been the accepted science regarding the etiology of autism, as developed over that past several decades. Three important features of this etiology ground the Extreme Male Brain theory. First, ASD is (...) disproportionately male (approximately 10:1 in the case of Asperger’s Syndrome or high-functioning autism (HFA) and approximately 4:1 in the case of autistic disorder). Second, ASD is not psychogenic but biological in origin, and hence is not the product of sexist conditioning or childrearing practices, although these may affect the development of the disorder. Third, ASD is regarded as a spectrum developmental disorder, unlike other disorders such as Down Syndrome that are diagnosed by a (nearly) binary criterion. Down Syndrome, for example, is diagnosed by the presence in all or most cells within a given individual of an extra copy of Chromosome 21. Autism, on the other hand, is diagnosed by the presence of a set of symptoms that vary in their intensity and in their milder forms seem to conform to purported sex differences in cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. -/- In this paper, I do not challenge accepted science regarding the etiology of autism, and I do not challenge the idea of ASD as a disorder. Nor do I wish to offer an alternative account of what autism is. Instead, I focus on the usefulness of thinking of a disorder as an extreme version of ordinary sex differences. Does it follow from the fact that a disorder is more often found in men that we should think of it as an extreme form of maleness? If not, what other conditions must be met in order to warrant this way of thinking about ASD? What does it mean to say that ASD is a form of “extreme male brain”? Feminists are rightly skeptical of theories that make claims about male and female brains, so how should we respond to the clear evidence that the differences between typical and ASD individuals are not caused by childrearing practices? I explain what I take to be Baron-Cohen’s central argument that autism should be seen as the extreme male brain, and critique that argument. I conclude that there is no good argument that autistic symptoms should be regarded as an extreme form of male mental traits, and that Baron-Cohen’s claim does not help us to understand autism, women, or men. His claim is a speculative thesis that is readily mobilized for sexist practices. As such it requires a higher threshold for evidentiary support and rigorous argumentation—support and argumentation that does not exist. -/- KEYWORDS: autism, brain, gender, neuroscience, feminism, male . (shrink)

In light of a well-documented deficit in theory of mind found in high-functioning individuals with autism and Asperger Syndrome, this article explores HFA and AS children’s social-cognitive understanding of other people as reflected in their linguistic performance when answering mundane, everyday questions posed by their family members during dinnertime interaction. Ethnographic observations and video recordings of spontaneous interaction at home reveal that, contrary to findings in cognitive psychological research, the majority of the time the children were able (...) to detect their interlocutors’ communicative intentions and produce relevant responses that were marked by their conversational partners as acceptable. This article proposes that this success is due in part to parents who, through different strategies, facilitate their HFA and AS children’s access to socio-cultural perspective-taking and their interlocutors’ intentions, and better their children’s communicative skills. (shrink)

Has language developed to serve as a system of communication or one of thought? While language is clearly an excellent tool for communication, the possible contribution of higher order cognitive processes other than language to communication may provide insights on how we think about language evolution. Studies show that bilingualism improves communication skills, possibly due to boosting domain general processes, thus suggesting a divide between communication and formal language. However, to date little attention has been paid to bilingual atypical child (...) populations presenting asymmetric developmental delays in language and communication skills. In this study, we explore the language-communication divide in bilingual and monolingual children diagnosed with High Functioning Autism (HFA), displaying primary communication difficulties, and those with Specific Language Impairment (SLI), displaying primary language difficulties. Children were tested on language, cognitive control, Theory of Mind (ToM), social comprehension and verbal communication. Results demonstrate that bilingual children with HFA exhibit enhanced cognitive control, ToM and social comprehension, which in turn improve their verbal communication as compared to their monolingual peers with HFA. On the other hand, no boost emerges in bilingual children with SLI, be it in cognitive control or ToM, though a weaker advantage (relative to the children with ASD) can be observed in their verbal communication skills, with significant mediation from social comprehension. The overall evidence suggests that language, though useful for communication, is not sufficient for communication, and may arguably not have evolved primarily for communicative purposes. (shrink)