This paper analyzes the connection between Hegel’s theory of objective thinking and language. The current interpretative trend considers the conceptual only in a formal and propositional manner and it understands the Hegelian theory of truth in the light of semantic inferentialism. In contrast with this interpretative trend, the paper argues for two claims. 1) Hegel’s notion of concept (Begriff) does not overlap with the structure of the proposition. 2) Language plays an essential and systematic role in Hegel’s philosophy, but language (...) can not be understood as the highest form of rational understanding. As for the Hegelian theory of truth, the paper criticizes the disjunction between the logical-formal perspective and the ontological perspective. For Hegel, the concept defines the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The correlate ontological monism represents, on the one hand, a critique of Kant’s cognitive dualism. On the other hand, Hegel’s ontological monism provides a theory of truth which constitutes an immanent criticism of the knowledge forms of the consciousness (Bewusstsein). From this point of view, language as well as the “social practice” of giving and asking for reasons show their onesidedness, because they still constitute a “subjective” sphere of knowledge. (shrink)

The article has two main aims: 1) the discussion of some contemporary interpretations of the last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and, more generally, of the whole Hegelian system, as an expression of a metaphysics of the absolute; 2) the analysis of the relationship between absolute knowing and finitude (considered primarily as a manifestation of the historical dimension of knowledge). With respect to the first point, the article discusses two theses about absolute knowing: the first considers Hegel's absolute as (...) a 'metaphysical object', the second highlights the untenability of the Hegelian claim that philosophy is the absolute knowledge of the absolute. Against the first argument, it is shown that it is not possible to conceive of absolute knowing as an object, highlighting the negative function and the historical character of the process of manifestation of the spirit. With respect to the second point, the article considers the relationship between absolute knowing and the finite dimension of consciousness, arguing that absolute knowing is a form of knowledge of consciousness and that it is realized by the historical and finite process of the development of humanity. (shrink)