This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in (...) his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model. (shrink)

There is a popular idea that a shift from a Principle of Charity to a Principle of Humanity, as famously advocated by Richard Grandy, offers considerable advantages in constructing theories of meaning for natural languages. My claim is that Grandy’s case for the superiority of the Principle of Humanity does not tell against the Principle of Charity developed by Donald Davidson. The paper outlines important developments in Davidson’s Principle of Charity, and his refinement of the Principle of Charity that he (...) found in Quine’s writings. I argue that Grandy’s criticisms, whilst sound against the Quinean principle he had in mind, do not extend to Davidson’s refined Principle of Charity. I then raise two further issues that face advocates of the Principle of Humanity as an improvement on Davidson’s Principle of Charity. (shrink)