7 found
Order:
See also
Christopher Jay
University of York
Christopher Jay
University College London
  1.  77
    The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for Religious Fictionalism.Christopher Jay - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3):207-232.
    In this paper I do three things. Firstly, I defend the view that in his most familiar arguments about morality and the theological postulates, the arguments which appeal to the epistemological doctrines of the first Critique, Kant is as much of a fictionalist as anybody not working explicitly with that conceptual apparatus could be: his notion of faith as subjectively and not objectively grounded is precisely what fictionalists are concerned with in their talk of nondoxastic attitudes. Secondly, I reconstruct a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  2.  42
    Impossible Obligations Are Not Necessarily Deliberatively Pointless.Christopher Jay - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):381-389.
    Many philosophers accept that ought implies can (OIC), but it is not obvious that we have a good argument for that principle. I consider one sort of argument for it, which seems to be a development of an Aristotelian idea about practical deliberation and which is endorsed by, amongst others, R. M. Hare and James Griffin. After briefly rehearsing some well-known objections to that sort of argument (which is based on the supposed pointlessness of impossible obligations), I present a further (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3.  74
    Testimony, Belief, and Non-Doxastic Faith: The Humean Argument for Religious Fictionalism.Christopher Jay - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (2):247-261.
    I set out an argument for religious fictionalism which, unusually, proceeds from realist assumptions to the conclusion that even though some people might know that God exists, others ought to accept only non-doxastically that God exists. The argument relies upon the idea that religious experiences can confer immediate warrant on religious beliefs, whereas the warrant conferred by testimony is defeated by some reasonable beliefs which many people have.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  33
    Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable.Christopher Jay - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):33-49.
    As is already well known, subjective consequentialists face a challenge which arises from the fact that many of the consequences of an action are unforeseeable: this fact makes trouble for the assignment of expected values. Recently there has been some discussion of the role of ‘indifference’ principles in addressing this challenge. In this article, I argue that adopting a principle of indifference to unforeseeable consequences will not work – not because of familiar worries about the rationality of such indifference principles, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  31
    Embracing Impossible Justice.Christopher Jay - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:567-583.
    It is often thought that considerations of practicality speak in favour of accepting the principle that if there is no practical alternative to something then that thing is not unjust. I present an argument which suggests that there are in fact practical costs to accepting such a principle, so that on grounds of practicality we perhaps ought to reject it. That argument does not assume that there are any demands of justice which it is impossible to meet, but only that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  36
    Review: Ameriks, Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation.Christopher Jay - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (2):337-339.
  7.  22
    Keeping Truth Safe From Democracy.Christopher Jay - 2009 - Public Reason 1 (2).