Tracing the history of the Ottoman and Safavid empires back to the Middle Period of Islamic history, this article focuses on their origins in the chieftaincies and the hybrid cultural formations of the Anatolian regions. While considering the inter/intracivilizational historical context of their respective rise to power, it is argued that the structural makeup of the empires differed primarily in their disparate forms of Sufi-knightly cultures, identified here as knightly-heroic (Ottoman) and millenarian-populist (Safavid), which is essentially tied to two distinctive (...) types of tribal political organizations: frontierchieftaincy (Ottoman) and sectarian-chieftaincy (Safavid). Although the original Ottoman and Safavid chieftaincies, based on the militant Ghazi and Qizilbash orders, dissolved once the roaming bands of warriors were replaced by more settled military formations in the course of long-term state-building processes, the influence of their Sufi-knightly cultural heritages is still manifest in modern Iranian and Turkish societies. (shrink)

Contrary to the expectations of several theorists belonging to the modernisation school, chieftaincy as a traditional institution survived various political changes throughout the 19th and 20th century in most African states. Nonetheless, their existence thereafter has varied in these states. Some states have lauded, recognised and employed chiefs for state development, while other states have blatantly ignored and designated the offices of chiefs as an obsolete governance institution that has outlived their usefulness. The variance in the disposition to chiefs (...) is identified as deeply rooted in a long-standing debate over the relationship between modernity and tradition. This study explores this debate, adopting the Ghanaian chieftaincy institution in its modern form as a case study. A synthesis of existing literature on the relevant concepts was developed and discussed in the development of the study. The study identified the major debate on tradition and modernity to be situated in a binary school, where one strand believes they can both exist together, and the other situates their argument in the need to abolish tradition completely from modern societies. For the Ghanaian setting, however, the chieftaincy institution is recognised and accorded its autonomy in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This has created a bifurcated state where constitutional law and customary law are implemented at the same time. Over the years, the interaction between both systems of governance has been seen mostly in land administration, local governance, and development. Chiefs as such are identified as playing extensive roles in state development and investment promotion through land administration, serving as gatekeepers between the central government and their subjects, promoting solidarity and employing their influence and expertise as a means for introducing sustainable development initiatives in their localities. However, conflicts and land mismanagement have been areas of contention, affecting their influence and relevance in recent times. The study recommends capacity building and further integration with the modern democratic Ghanaian institutions to improve the contribution of chiefs to the development of Ghana and other contexts where they exist. (shrink)

En los últimos años la historiografía incrementó su interés por el análisis comparado entre estados y evoluciones político-sociales, una excelente perspectiva para el análisis de la historia contemporánea. Las diferentes manifestaciones de clientelismo político que se desarrollaron en la Europa mediterránea desde el último cuarto del siglo XIX, caso del caciquismo español, el opportunisme francés y el transformismo italiano, vienen a ser la plasmación del pragmatismo político independientemente de la condición ideológica, y además, sirvieron de puente entre el fin del (...) liberalismo y la instauración de las democracias. Pero estas relaciones de poder oficiosas también fueron el intento de las élites y notables por fortalecer su posición ante los nuevos movimientos e ideologías que eclosionan con la sociedad de masas. Con esta comunicación pretendemos reflejar cómo las políticas clientelares desarrolladas en la Europa mediterránea en la transición del siglo XIX al XX permitieron: a) la estabilidad necesaria para iniciar reformas en un ambiente sociopolítico todavía en formación; b) fueron sistemas donde se hicieron visibles las contradicciones entre el marco legal, fundamentado en los principios liberales, y la aplicación de los mismos por parte de unas élites que pretendían mantener un orden político y social que les era favorable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sacrificial "As-If" and Avuncular HilarityLiving by MéconnaissanceWiel Eggen (bio)INTRODUCTION: THE CURIOUS QUESTIONAt my departure for anthropological fieldwork in the Central African Republic (RCA), just after Girard's seminal work La Violence et le sacré had come to upset my structuralist tutors in Paris, I was given a list of penetrating questions to probe in the field, since my research was to be conducted in an area known for its a-cephalous (...) traditions with little or no political or religious centralization.1 The prime critique concerned Girard's apparent return to a bluntly utilitarian vision of myth and religion as the mental framework of society's ritual foundations, in line with Durkheim's functionalist analysis of archaic religion, which was finely reworded in Lord Raglan's recent preface to a cluster of Hocart's articles titled The Life-Giving Myth.2 The approach had come to dominate, as a way of unraveling outdated transcendentalist claims, and also underpinned Freudian and Marxist attacks on religion. After Kant's Critique of Pure Reason had given the lie to any claims of access to transcendent realms, the deontological view of religion as society's functionalist toolbox for orderly [End Page 69] conduct became dominant. But, inspired also by such "masters of suspicion" in human sciences, structuralism had set out even beyond that utilitarian perspective. In a decisive bolt of relativism, it took myths to be a mere mental ordering of daily observations into a logical frame, independent of any ritual or social utility. So, how could Girard once again declare social control via rituals to be religion's true aim, allot a prime role to sacrificial rites, and, most alarmingly, thereby raise the suspicion of aiming to rehabilitate Christian dogmas?I was urged to go and check this theory on sacrifices, scapegoating, social rivalry, and on the shaping of archaic society, its forms of authority, and even sacred kingship. Reflecting on the questions, though, I noted that they overlooked a critical point in Girard's hypothesis, which I read as reverse functionalism. In fact, Girard viewed religion's social function and the issuing cultural regulations as rooted in a radical "lie," or in what he labels méconnaissance. Worded in evolutionary terms, he hypothesized not so much a kind of Darwinian utilitarian adaptation, but rather the alternative of "exaptation," or what has been called an oblique functionalism.After I had learned enough of the Banda language to start my research, though, my schedules were thrown in disarray on my first evening in the village that was to be my starting point. It presented me with a curious quandary. The village of Wademi, some 25 km north of Ippy, in the sparsely populated wooded savannah, was home to two exogamous patrilineal clans that straddle a little river and sit on a dirt road constructed by the colonial power for the collection of cotton. To oversee this two-clan unit a chief had been appointed with the title of makonji, a loanword from the national Sango language. This gentle, friendly man had offered to host me in his own cemented house and organized a welcome for me in the customary way of staging a pleasant storytelling session, punctuated with joyous songs and dances, lasting well into the night. Most of the stories and songs figured Tere, the famous trickster figure, who resembles Ture in neighboring Azande-land, well documented by E. Evans-Pritchard.3 The enjoyable, moonlit session was shot through with outbursts of laughter. It brought the two clans together, including the women and children. Before turning in, the makonji's junior son, who had been assigned my assistant and interpreter, came to convey his father's sincere but puzzling query, whether Tere actually was the same as Jesus Christ. Actually, his French name in Banda phonetics implied so: Christ Jésu = Tre se te jesu; and "Jesu Christ = Jesu Tre."4 Taken by surprise and much in need of some rest after a rather demanding day, I politely asked to let the issue rest till the morning.This question was all the more disturbing, as Christians were wont to call Jesus the Lord, and relate this to chieftaincy... (shrink)

Previous chapter From Society to State Rhythms Mauss and Evans-Pritchard provided also a few hints concerning the transition from societies in which politics was immanent in trade and conflict rhythms to more complex ones in which an embryo of state power had already emerged. During this intermediary stage, the latter still partly followed the rhythms of society. Mauss noted that when, in archaic societies, authority was embodied in the form of chieftaincy or kingship, it was not always - Etudes (...) chinoises – Nouvel article. (shrink)