In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action:Burke and Bourdieu on PracticeDana AndersonThe British official's habit, in the Empire's remotest spots, of dressing for dinner is in effect the transporting of an idol, the vessel of a motive that has its sanctuary in the homeland.—Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 44In his recent Kenneth Burke and the Conversation after Philosophy, Timothy Crusius locates Burke in the context of "PostPhilosophical" thought by (...) describing Burke's expansive Dramatistic project as a praxis—as a program encompassing "any act whatsoever, including symbolic action (i.e., expression, whether artistic or discursive), in behalf of a better life." When praxis is conceived broadly as a dialectical perspective on human action—that agents and structures interact in mutually determining ways—the term becomes, in fact, an accurate summary of the entire Burkean corpus: "If we understand it as Burke does," Crusius continues, "all that he wrote is praxis" (1999, 198). This panoramic scope of Burke's dialectical inquiry is certainly one reason it remains rhetorical theory's perhaps most flexible and productive framework for considering human action; the Dramatistic pentad and its ratios for discussing the attribution of motive continue to invite theoretical "ways of placement" as multifaceted as human motives themselves.Speaking of Burke's work in terms of praxis, however, at least in the term's contemporary critical usage,1 raises a question regarding a cognate concept that the idea of praxis entails: in what sense is Burke's pentadic grammar of action equipped to consider the habituated actions characteristic of human practice?Practice, as a conceptual descendant of Marxian praxis, retains a connection with what Marx called "human sensuous activity" (1968, 28-30).2 In its most general sense, practice refers to the regular and repeated activities of agents that, in their quotidian enactment, dialectically [End Page 255] constitute an agent's sense of self and of reality in relation to external conditions of existence. While the activities of agents will tend to reify the dominant external conditions in which agents act, these external conditions are nonetheless open to change inasmuch as the evolving practices of individuals might come to challenge them. This perspective of the determined, yet determining nature of human practice is aptly summarized in The German Ideology, where Marx and Engels famously argue that "circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances" (2000, 189).3 As Michel de Certeau's seminal studies of practice have demonstrated (de Certeau 1984; de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998), the power of this relationship of mutual constitution between individuals and their worlds of external circumstances owes directly to the banality of the actions through which such constitution is accomplished—actions ranging from the way bread is served in a given household, to the way cosmetics are purchased in department stores, to the general "ways of operating" in urban spaces, including simply walking in one's own neighborhood (de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998; Mayol 1998, 7-13). As Judith Butler very poignantly summarizes, it is through precisely such "embodied rituals of everydayness," however "taken-for-granted" they may be, that "a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own 'obviousness' " (1999, 113-14).The constitutive dynamics of such practical actions should surely figure prominently into any conception of Burke's work as praxis. Indeed, this dynamic is already implicit in the fact that, for Burke, it is only through the possibility of mutually transforming both ourselves and our worlds through actions material and symbolic that we might begin to move toward a better life. But while Dramatism and practice rest on similar perspectives of the dialectically constitutive nature of human action, several aspects of the grammar through which Burke investigates motive might appear to limit, or even to preclude, the Dramatistic examination of practice as a kind of motivated action. More specifically, Burke's consistent "anti-Behaviorist" emphasis on the conscious or purposive nature of action questions the extent to which Dramatism can account for the dispositional and habituated actions characteristic of practice, actions for which agents would be least able to articulate conscious purposes. To cast the issue in the context of my epigraph above... (shrink)

El artículo analiza los aportes de la teoría sociológica de Norbert Elías y Pierre Bourdieu al campo de las ciencias sociales. Siguiendo a Corcuff, podemos ubicar las obras de estos dos autores dentro de las teorías constructivistas. Teorías que producen un desplazamiento mismo del objeto de la sociología: ni la sociedad ni los individuos, concebidos como entidades separadas, sino las relaciones entre individuos. Con ello, se abordan el rechazo a la teoría pura; el abordaje multidisciplinar y la vigilancia epistemológica en (...) la construcción del objeto de estudio; la superación de la oposición subjetivismo-objetivismo; la explicación social, histórica y relacional de los fenómenos sociales; la concepción agonista de lo social; y, por último, el eje temático que atraviesa las obras de dos autores con diferencias pero complementarios. (shrink)

En este artículo retomo el diálogo abierto entre los desarrollos schutzianos sobre fenomenología del poder propuestos por Jochen Dreher y el enfoque socio-antropológico sobre habitus y poder simbólico de Pierre Bourdieu. Dreher señala que es posible encontrar en la perspectiva de Bourdieu “puntos de partida claves” para una fenomenología del poder. Sin embargo, al criticar el carácter estático de la noción de habitus, opta por la teoría de las relevancias de Schutz, la cual, a diferencia de la propuesta bourdeana, da (...) lugar central a la perspectiva subjetiva del actor individual. En este trabajo mostraré las limitaciones de esta crítica al cotejarla con los desarrollos de Bourdieu sobre habitus desgarrados/escindidos, reflexividad/socioanálisis y contradiestramiento del cuerpo. Como contribución a una fenomenología del poder, propondré una lectura alternativa de la noción bourdeana de habitus, basada en Merleau-Ponty, puesta a prueba en una investigación empírica sobre colegios de clases altas. (shrink)