As concerns the explication of the intuitive notion of truthmaking, Barry Smith has an insight that deserves more attention. Basically, in his view, an object x makes a proposition true iff (i) x necessitates and (ii) is representationally closely tied with x. To be more specific, he suggests that (ii) is fulfilled only if x is among ’s ontological commitments. I appreciate his basic insight but reject his specific suggestion. I argue that we can make a more attractive proposal from (...) his basic insight if we take into consideration that the close tie can also be realized by ’s being about x. (shrink)

Hume frequently states that we are ignorant of genuine power. There is a well-known internal difficulty concerning this claim concerning ignorance. According to Hume, we do not have an impression-based idea of genuine power; on the other hand, every noun needs a corresponding idea to be meaningful. Is his claim concerning ignorance, which makes use of the noun ‘power’, meaningless in light of his own criterion of meaningfulness? I focus on two exegetical approaches to this difficulty proposed in the literature (...) of the ‘New Hume Debate’: 1) we may read Hume's own positive definitions of power back into his claim of ignorance to ensure the meaningfulness of ‘power’; and 2) ‘power’ may correspond to a relative idea of genuine power and derive its meaning from this relative idea. I argue against both of these solutions and offer my own solution that is quite close to the text. However, adopting my proposal demands a price: a considerable part of Hume's argumentative undert.. (shrink)

Hirsch advocates a certain kind of metaontological deflationism. He believes that, sometimes, metaphysicians are talking past each other. In his opinion, the debate between compositional organicists and compositional universalists is a prototypical verbal dispute. I argue that his diagnosis is wrong especially with regard to this central case. My argument also weakens his deflationist position in general.

There are two questions concerning Hume’s doctrine of existence which have not yet found any persuasive answer: What is his argument in favour of the thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence? What are the semantic and metaphysical consequences of this thesis within his philosophical framework? This paper mainly aims to answer question. In order to do that, I will first explain why some reconstructions suggested by interpreters such as Cummins and Bricke are problematic. One of them relies (...) on exegetically dubious presumptions; the other departs too much from Hume’s text. Then, I will offer my own reconstruction that makes maximal use of some principles which are very familiar to Hume’s readers, including the principle stating the similarity between perceptions and their images. After that, I will discuss a potential objection to my reconstruction and make a brief remark on question, arguing that, as opposed to numerous interpreters’ concerns, Hume’s thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence does not by itself prevent him from being able to conceive negative existential propositions. (shrink)

Dieses Buch untersucht Humes revolutionäre Theorie des begrifflichen Denkens.Das begriffliche Denken ist eine wichtige Tätigkeit des Geistes. Was genau geschieht im Geist, wenn wir diese Tätigkeit ausüben? Im Vergleich zu anderen Philosophen der Frühen Neuzeit hat Hume bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage eine grössere Schwierigkeit: Humesche Ideen sind (anders als bei Descartes und Locke) rein phänomenaler Natur. Sie sind geistige "Bildchen" ohne begriffliche Struktur. Wie soll das begriffliche Denken mit Hilfe derartiger Ideen möglich sein? Hume reagierte auf diese Herausforderung mit (...) einem völlig neuartigen Ansatz und wurde zum Bahnbrecher einer moderneren Theorie des Denkens. Eine klare Einsicht in diesen Teil der Humeschen Philosophie ist zudem unentbehrlich für ein adäquates Verständnis seines Agnostizismus bezüglich der kausalen Kraft und seiner Metaphysik der Existenz. (shrink)