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  1.  44
    Another impossibility result for normal form games.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (1):73-80.
    It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which (...)
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  2.  98
    A short step between democracy and dictatorship.Antonio Quesada - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (2):149-166.
    When preferences are defined over two alternatives and societies are variable, the group formed by the relative majority rule, the unanimity rule, the dictatorial rules, and the strongly dictatorial rules is characterized in terms of five axioms: unanimity, reducibility, substitutability, exchangeability, and parity. This result is used to provide characterizations of each of these rules by postulating separating axioms, that is, an axiom and its negation. Such axioms identify traits specifically differentiating a type of rule from the other types. For (...)
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  3.  52
    Belief system foundations of backward induction.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403.
    Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
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  4.  47
    Power of Enforcement and Dictatorship.Antonio Quesada - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (4):381-387.
    A new Arrovian impossibility is obtained without invoking independence of irrelevant alternatives type assumptions. The new conditions leading to the impossibility are based on the concept of power of enforcement, and specify how this power can (see A3) or cannot be expanded (see A1, A2 and A4).
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  5.  15
    The normal form is not sufficient.Antonio Quesada - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):235-243.
    The relationship between extensive and normal form analyses in non-cooperative game theory seems to be dominated, at least traditionally, by the so-called ‘sufficiency of the normal form principle’, according to which all that is necessary to analyse and ‘solve’ an extensive game is already in its normal form representation. The traditional defence of the sufficiency principle, that Myerson (1991, p. 50) attributes to von Neumann and Morgenstern, holds that, with respect to extensive games, it can be assumed without loss of (...)
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