Background We investigated the personal philosophies of eight persons with a tetraplegic condition (four male, four female), all living in Sweden with a chronic spinal cord injury (SCI) and all reporting a good life. Our purpose was to discover if there is a philosophical mindset that may play a role in living a good life with a traumatic SCI. Methods Two rounds of in-depth qualitative interviews were performed by the same interviewer, a philosophical practitioner by training (de Miranda). The second (...) round systematically covered the following elements: bodily sense, sense of self, sense of belonging, sense of the possible, sense of purpose and philosophical sense. This six-step method developed by de Miranda is called SMILE_PH, an acronym for Sense-Making Interviews Looking at Elements of Philosophical Health. Results All the interviewees, as a consequence of their trauma, reported having gone through a reinvention of themselves which implied questioning the meaning and purpose of their life in particular and life in general. A philosophical rather than realistic sense of the possible was abstracted toward teleological growth. All interviewees developed a sense of purpose based on self-interested altruism and solidarity with disabled peers. Conclusions To reinvent a good life with SCI, in addition to physical training and willpower, one needs to consider philosophical questions about the self and life, what Kant called the cosmic interests of reason: What may I hope? What must I do? What can I know? Our results indicate that we should, in the future, explore what the philosophical health approach may bring to rehabilitation processes in the months or years that follow the trauma. (shrink)

The development of diagrammatic logics is strongly motivated by the desire to make formal reasoning accessible to broad audiences. One major research problem, for which surprisingly little progress has been made, is to understand how to choose between semantically equivalent diagrams from the perspective of human cognition. The particular focus of this paper is on choosing between diagrams that represent either the presence or absence of individuals. To understand how to best make this choice, we conducted an empirical study. We (...) found that representing the presence of individuals supported task performance either significantly better than, or no worse than, representing the absence of individuals. The particularly striking feature of our results was that representing the absence of individuals in a way that makes the diagram highly cluttered is detrimental to human cognition. As a result, diagrams with this feature should be avoided, but diagrams using presence or low-cluttered absence can be used to support cognition in the context of the tasks performed in our study. (shrink)

Free rides and observational advantages occur in visualizations when they reveal facts that must be inferred from an alternative representation. Understanding whether these concepts correspond to cognitive advantages is important: do they facilitate information extraction, saving the ‘deductive cost’ of making inferences? This paper presents the first evaluations of free rides and observational advantages in visualizations of sets compared to text. We found that, for Euler and linear diagrams, free rides and observational advantages yielded significant improvements in task performance. For (...) Venn diagrams, whilst their observational advantages yielded significant performance benefits over text, this was not universally true for free rides. The consequences are two-fold: more research is needed to establish when free rides are beneficial, and the results suggest that observational advantages better explain the cognitive advantages of diagrams over text. A take-away message is that visualizations with observational advantages are likely to be cognitively advantageous over competing representations. (shrink)

Michael Fotiadis (1994) and Barbara Little (1994) both question the oppositions that structure current debate about the "objectivity" of archaeological science; they raise concerns about my own proposal for a "mitigated objectivism" where it reaffirms these oppositions. I welcome their discussion and offer three responses to clarify and situate my own position. Most valuable, they identify several lines of inquiry that should be pursued beyond the philosophical analyses I have developed, in this instance of gender research.