The adoption of the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights by the United Nations in 2011 created a new governance instrument aimed at improving the promotion of human rights by business enterprises. While reaffirming states duties to uphold human rights in law, the UNGPs called on firms to promote the realization of human rights within global markets. The UNGPs thus have sought to embed human rights more firmly within the field of corporate social responsibility and to use CSR practices (...) to improve corporate human rights accountability. In this paper, we explore how this incorporation of human rights into the CSR field has affected the business practices and public commitments British firms have made to promote human rights. We analyse the CSR reports published by the 50 largest British firms over a 20-year period starting in the late 1990s and interview senior CSR managers of these firms. We find that these firms have expanded how they articulate their responsibility for human rights over time. These commitments however remain largely focused on improving management practices such as due diligence and remediation procedures. Firms are often both vague and selective about which substantive human rights they engage with in light of their concerns about their market competitiveness and broader legitimacy. These outcomes suggest that, while firms cannot completely resist the normative pressures exerted by the CSR field, they retain significant resources and agency in translating such pressure into concrete practices. (shrink)

The article aims to understand the notion underlying the term “revolution” in René de Chateaubriand’s Essay on Revolutions, making particular reference not only to the substantial notes of the 1826 re-edition, provided by the author himself, but also to the conceptual constellation surrounding the nascent concept of revolution, in particular “history” and “revolutionary rupture”.

Philosophers have long been interested in the study of induction. This paper aims at examining Philoponus’ treatment, with a focus on his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, which is an especially rich source of information on this topic. Following in Aristotle’s footsteps, Philoponus maintains that it is through induction that universal knowledge is achieved, but in his interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine he also introduces intriguing novelties. In particular, I argue that in some passages he treats induction as an intellectual (...) means of teaching and learning, that is, as a logical argument-form in which a universal conclusion is inferred from particular premises. In other passages, however, he treats induction as a sort of sense perception, specifically that which triggers the recovery of innate universal knowledge. (shrink)

In this article, I contend that Franco Basaglia’s work of reform in psychiatry can be read as a proposal for an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. My claim is that Basaglia’s reform is to be regarded not only as a successful dismantling of the old disciplinary psychiatry but also as an ante litteram attempt at preventing what Pierangelo Di Vittorio refers to as a “biopolitical psychiatry.” Di Vittorio’s definition is notably limited, for he seems to overlook Foucault’s conceptual oscillations between affirmative biopolitics (...) and negative biopower. Di Vittorio’s biopolitical psychiatry does not bear any affirmative connotation, and his radically negative perspective should rather be considered as the exertion of biopower in psychiatry, as a negative involution of an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. I propose to read Basaglia’s entire work of reform, which can be summarised by his famous motto “bracketing mental illness” – that is, disregarding the patient’s diagnosis – as an affirmative biopolitical psychiatry. I suggest that biopolitical psychiatry cannot be understood only in negative terms, as Di Vittorio does, and that Basaglia did not propose to oppose its emergence; rather, he actively fought against disciplinary psychiatry. Basaglia’s reform does not prevent psychiatry from being one of the dispositifs of biopolitics, that is, one of the possible means through which political power reaches the lives of people: for him, this prevention might be impossible or even undesirable. On the other hand, it would preclude psychiatry from becoming a dispositif of biopower, one that would ultimately bring life under such strict control that it would degenerate into a thanatopolitical implosion. (shrink)