Mary Astell is a fascinating seventeenth‐century figure whose work admits of many interpretations. One feature of her work that has received little attention is her focus on bad custom. This is surprising; Astell clearly regards bad custom as exerting a kind of epistemic power over agents, particularly women, in a way that limits their intellectual capacities. This article aims to link two contemporary sociopolitical/social‐epistemological projects by showing how a seventeenth‐century thinker anticipated these projects. Astell's account of bad custom shows that (...) she was attuned to the kinds of institutional or structural explanations theorized by Sally Haslanger, and that she acknowledges that bad custom—as an institutional or structural explanation—is intimately linked with epistemic injustice, albeit a kind not yet captured by contemporary social epistemologists. I call this form of epistemic injustice found in Astell epistemic internalization injustice. I argue that the epistemic significance of Astell's notion of bad custom is that it enables us to understand how bad custom conditions human relations in such a way as to result in epistemic injustice. Through coming to understand her notion of bad custom, we can expand our understanding of social epistemic phenomena like epistemic injustice. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Marie de Gournay and Anton Wilhelm Amo, though thinking and writing in different social contexts, each offer an account of prejudice which bears a deep philosophical resonance to that of the other. This resonance is striking and mutually illuminating: Gournay and Amo develop a view of prejudice as a kind of epistemic and moral viciousness that damages both the prejudicial person and their socio-epistemic neighbors. Their accounts highlight how agents are rightly held responsible for prejudice, as it is the agents' (...) epistemic negligence and moral failure that allows prejudice to take hold. As such, their view offers a balance between a critical examination of individuals and an acknowledgement of the deep sociality that pervades the epistemic domain. (shrink)

The question of Russell’s engagement with feminist ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is helpfully illuminated, I argue, by comparison to some of his feminist contemporaries—namely, Victoria Claflin Woodhull (1838–1927) and Emma Goldman (1869–1940). Like Woodhull and Goldman, Russell argues for women’s right to vote, a new sexual ethic, and a significant revision to marriage. These are paradigmatic feminist projects, and so would seem to suggest that Russell, particularly within Marriage and Morals, has significant philosophical overlap with (...) some of the feminist philosophers of his time. His similarities with feminist thinkers and activists Woodhull and Goldman on the classical feminist concerns of sex, suffrage, and marriage suggest that Russell’s views may yet find a place in the history of feminism, even if he does not. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to care ethics.

Women thinking and writing about friendship in the early modern period were indebted to traditional interest in this topic dating back to Plato and Aristotle. This tradition was deeply misogynistic: real friendship was often claimed to be beyond the grasp of women. However, some women philosophers—most notably Marie le Jars de Gournay, Mary Astell, and Gabrielle Suchon—wrote about friendship in ways that both emerge from the history of Western philosophy and yet resist this inegalitarian framework. This chapter explores the views (...) of these three philosophers: for each, real friendship represents a means to obtain a different kind of meaningful freedom. For Gournay, friendship is a means to epistemic freedom and epistemic justice; for Astell, friendship is a means to moral freedom and relational autonomy, and for Suchon, friendship provides support that facilitates political freedom—freedom from institutional commitments or constraints. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Madeleine de Scudéry (1607–1701) is best remembered as a novelist rather than as a philosopher, but she is both a gifted literary figure and an overlooked philosopher. These roles are, at least in her case, inseparable. Through her dialogues, Scudéry offers an account of the conversation that is at once a rhetorical social art as well as a substantive philosophical phenomenon and socio-political practice with feminist effects. According to Scudéry, how one converses and what one converses about provides new (...) knowledge and ways of thinking as well as the potential to reshape our social and political relations. Scudérian conversation is not only a means to acquire and practice rhetoric – an art characterized by gendered hierarchy –but also a means of teaching women that equality in historically gendered domains is possible. Ultimately, Scudérian conversation is a kind of feminist praxis that flies under the radar in virtue of appearing to be merely a social art. (shrink)

Madeleine de Scudéry is best remembered as a novelist rather than as a philosopher, but she is both a gifted literary figure and an overlooked philosopher. These roles are, at least in...