In this paper, I will analyze and critically evaluate 20th century American philosopher Robert Nozick’s position regarding utilitarianism; how he refutes utilitarianism with reference to two new concepts called “Experience Machine” and “Utility Monster”. I will argue that if we were given the option of entering into an experience machine as Nozick presented in his book Anarchy State and Utopia, in which we can create a new better life for ourselves, then it would be irrational to refuse the option. I (...) will then reply to Nozick’s objection regarding utilitarianism within his concept of utility monster, where he argued that accepting the theory of utilitarianism causes the necessary acceptance of a utility monster, that is, the condition that some people would use this doctrine to justify the exploitation of others. I will argue here that giving “happy units” to weak utility monsters can bring about wonderful result. All my arguments are formed within utilitarian consequentialist framework. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 165-176. (shrink)

Ensuring access to clean water is one of the most important development and health challenges of the twenty-first century. Given the manifold impacts of business activities on water resources, corporate water actions should be of central concern to business ethics researchers. Yet so far we know too little about whether business activities that impact on water resources are noticed or how corporate water actions are valued by a firm’s stakeholders, including by financial markets. In response, we conduct an event study (...) to investigate the shareholder wealth effect of reports of corporate water actions. We explore stock market reactions to water actions by S&P 500 firms from 2005 to 2017, showing that the market reacts positively to reports of responsible water actions and negatively to irresponsible actions. We further explain that these abnormal returns to water actions are associated with a firm’s past performance on ethical issues, arguing that the reputational effects from prior corporate social responsibility and irresponsibility influence market reactions. Our analysis provides evidence that there are diminishing marginal returns to responsible water actions for firms with records of past responsibility and an offsetting effect for those with past irresponsibility. Similarly, we demonstrate an insurance effect that limits punishment for irresponsible water actions for firms with responsible performance records and diminishing negative marginal returns for those already seen to be irresponsible. This study is the first to show that shareholders recognize market value in corporate water actions and are prepared to award or punish firms in stock markets based on their impacts on water. (shrink)