This article comments on Sylvia Walby’s critique of the politics of difference and the relativist tendencies she sees represented in some contemporary feminist positions. While the general direction of Walby’s intervention is not disputed, the theoretical architecture of her text as well as the way she develops her argumentation are critically assessed. Problems in the architecture of the text concern the unclear interconnection between epistemological questions, questions of moral philosophy/political theory and practical politics. The critique focuses on three aspects: on (...) problems connected with Walby’s use of the Habermasian notion of ‘argumentation’, on difficulties related to an incoherent use of the notion of ‘difference’ and on the inadequate way in which she constructs oppositions between theories. The article lays out some of the theoretical backgrounds of the debates Walby refers to, in order to enhance a more specific comparison and critique of positions. (shrink)

Who was responsible for the murder of Sennacherib? This question fascinated Assyriologists for most of the twentieth century, until a new interpretation of an obscure, fragmentary letter convinced many that a disenfranchised elder son of Sennacherib, Urad-Mullissu, had hatched the conspiracy. Since the publication of this text in 1980 by Simo Parpola, near consensus has developed about these events. In this paper I reexamine the issue and revive the theory that Esarhaddon, Sennacherib’s son and successor, may have been behind the (...) assassination, rather than his elder brother. I do not question the coherence of Parpola’s interpretation, but I suggest that the field may place undue confidence in a single broken, decontextualized letter. More importantly, the evidence implicating Esarhaddon is ample. I extend six arguments that point toward Esarhaddon’s guilt, most of which are derived from Esarhaddon’s own account of events in his famous Nineveh A inscription. I do not propose that we can establish Esarhaddon’s guilt conclusively at this remove, but I conclude that the weight of this evidence equals, if not surpasses, that which points to a plot concocted by Urad-Mullissu. (shrink)

Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a multi-modal logic for reasoning about the change of knowledge in multi-agent systems. It extends epistemic logic by a modal operator for actions which announce logical formulas to other agents. In Hilbert-style proof calculi for DEL, modal action formulas are reduced to epistemic logic, whereas current sequent calculi for DEL are labelled systems which internalize the semantic accessibility relation of the modal operators, as well as the accessibility relation underlying the semantics of the actions. We (...) present a novel cut-free ordinary sequent calculus, called |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $|⁠, for propositional DEL. In contrast to the known sequent calculi, our calculus does not internalize the accessibility relations, but—similar to Hilbert style proof calculi—action formulas are reduced to epistemic formulas. Since no ordinary sequent calculus for full S5 modal logic is known, the proof rules for the knowledge operator and the Boolean operators are those of an underlying S4 modal calculus. We show the soundness and completeness of |$ \textbf{G4}_{P,A}[] $| and prove also the admissibility of the cut-rule and of several other rules for introducing the action modality. (shrink)