Radical Probabilism Revisited

Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980 (2006)
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In this essay, I analyze and critique Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. The basic theses defining it are examined, particularly the idea that probabilistic coherence involves a kind of "consistency." The main challenges to Jeffrey's view are (1) that there is an inconsistency between regarding probabilities as subjective and some probabilistic judgments as better than others, and (2) that decision theory so conceived has no normative import. I argue that both of these challenges can be met.



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Lyle Zynda
Indiana University South Bend

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Probability and the Art of Judgment.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1992 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

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