Embracing Scientific Realism

Cham: Springer (2022)
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Abstract

This book provides philosophers of science with new theoretical resources for making their own contributions to the scientific realism debate. Readers will encounter old and new arguments for and against scientific realism. They will also be given useful tips for how to provide influential formulations of scientific realism and antirealism. Finally, they will see how scientific realism relates to scientific progress, scientific understanding, mathematical realism, and scientific practice.

Chapters

Scientific Realism and Scientific Practice

Does the realism debate matter for scientific practice? Shaw attempts to justify a positive answer to this question by providing a scientific episode in which scientists run meta-inductions and historical inductions. I point out that the meta-inductions and historical inductions are different from t... see more

In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument

Both semantic realism and epistemic realism inhere in Putnam’s no-miracles argument . Laudan’s objection to realism is compatible with both semantic and epistemic realism. To reject the NMA for the reason that the success of science does not cry out for explanation is to violate the basic rule for e... see more

Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism

Entity realism, minimal realism, axiological realism, van Fraassen’s definition of scientific realism, and selective realism all aspire to be versions of realism, as their names suggest. On close examination, however, they are not variants of realism but rather variants of putative realism. In addit... see more

Formulating Scientific Realism and Antirealism

Putnam’s formulation of realism and antirealism can trigger both formulational and epistemological debates. By contrast, van Fraassen’s formulation of realism and empiricism can trigger formulational debates, but not epistemological ones. Realism is significantly different from antirealism under Put... see more

Critiques of Scientific Antirealism

Antirealists are subject to the pessimistic induction over antirealists. Antirealists cannot explain events in terms of T due to Moore’s paradox, the problem of disconcerting questions, and the problem of deceptive speech acts. Antirealists will not and cannot predict theoretical events. Antirealist... see more

Scientific Realism and Mathematical Realism

It is a fallacious inference that since puzzling sentences result from the attribution of spatial and temporal predicates to mathematical objects, mathematical objects exist in the abstract world. The abstract world is queer, allowing for contradictory states of affairs. The notion of a tricle under... see more

Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism

I introduce the following six new arguments for realism, all of which radically differ from the no-miracles argument. The optimistic induction over realists holds that since the realists of the early twentieth century were right to believe the theories of their time, their present and future philoso... see more

Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress

There are four competing accounts of scientific progress in the literature. They are the problem-solving, semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts. I defend a new account of scientific progress that I call “the evidential account.” It asserts that science progresses when the amount of evidence for o... see more

Scientific Realism and Scientific Understanding

According to epistemism, we scientifically understand explananda in terms of explanantia, provided that they are true and we justifiably believe them. On this account, scientific understanding requires the three ingredients of knowledge: belief, justification, and truth. Therefore, scientific unders... see more

New Topics for Future Debates

Stanford makes two proposals to revamp the realism debate. The first proposal is that rival discussants stop debating whether our best theories are approximately true. I object that this proposal overlooks the fact that there are realists in the literature in addition to pessimists and selective rea... see more

Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction

The pessimistic induction should not be conflated with Laudan’s objection that there are historical counterexamples to realism, nor with the Humean argument that earlier theories were false, so current theories are unwarranted. It is arbitrary for antirealists to accept the PI but to reject inferenc... see more

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Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology

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