The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism

Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):336-361 (2013)
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Abstract

Recent scholarship (Goodwin & Darley, 2008) on the meta-ethical debate between objectivism and relativism has found people to be mixed: they are objectivists about some issues, but relativists about others. The studies discussed here sought to explore this further. Study 1 explored whether giving people the ability to identify moral issues for themselves would reveal them to be more globally objectivist. Study 2 explored people's meta-ethical commitments more deeply, asking them to provide verbal explanations for their judgments. This revealed that while people think they are relativists, this may not always be the case. The explanations people gave were sometimes rated by outside (blind) coders as being objective, even when given a relativist response. Nonetheless, people remained meta-ethical pluralists. Why this might be is discussed

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Citations of this work

Moral objectivism across the lifespan.James R. Beebe & David Sackris - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):912-929.
Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.Thomas Pölzler - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):455-476.
Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):53-82.
Experimental moral philosophy.Mark Alfano, Don Loeb & Alex Plakias - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
The elements of moral philosophy.James Rachels & Stuart Rachels - 2019 - New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education. Edited by James Rachels.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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