The Leibniz’s Law Problem

Metaphysica 11 (2):137-151 (2010)
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Abstract

Stage theorists invoke the idea of counterpart relations to make sense of how objects are able to persist despite their claim that an object is identical with a single instantaneous stage. According to stage theorists, an object persists if and only if it has a later counterpart that bears the appropriate counterpart relation of identity to it. Whilst objects can and do persist, stages cannot and do not. This seems to amount to a refutation of Leibniz’s law. Stage theorists think that the nature of the counterpart relation invoked depends on how it is that the object is referred to. In this paper, I argue that the context sensitivity that they invoke here gives stage theorists a response to the Leibniz’s Law Problem.

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Citations of this work

Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Stage with Gunk.Daniel Giberman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):228-238.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.

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