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Crawford L. Elder [66]Crawford Elder [9]Crawford Latterner Elder [1]
  1.  45
    Real Natures and Familiar Objects.Crawford Elder - 2004 - Bradford.
    In _Real Natures and Familiar Objects_ Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we are (...)
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  2.  70
    From an Ontological Point of View.Crawford L. Elder - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):757-760.
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  3.  92
    Familiar Objects and Their Shadows.Crawford L. Elder - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain (...)
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  4.  22
    Real Natures and Familiar Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 2004 - Bradford.
    In _Real Natures and Familiar Objects_ Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we are (...)
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  5. Real Natures and Familiar Objects.Crawford Elder - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):670-672.
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  6. ‘On the Place of Artefacts in Ontology.Crawford Elder - 2007 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representaion. Oxford University Press. pp. 33--51.
     
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  7. Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities.Crawford L. Elder - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):649-667.
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  8. Against Universal Mereological Composition.Crawford Elder - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):433-454.
    This paper opposes universal mereological composition (UMC). Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is (...)
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  9.  68
    Biological Species Are Natural Kinds.Crawford L. Elder - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):339-362.
    This paper argues that typical biological species are natural kinds, on a familiar realist understanding of natural kinds—classes of individuals across which certain properties cluster together, in virtue of the causal workings of the world. But the clustering is far from exceptionless. Virtually no properties, or property-combinations, characterize every last member of a typical species—unless they can also appear outside the species. This motivates some to hold that what ties together the members of a species is the ability to interbreed, (...)
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  10.  96
    Conventionalism and Realism‐Imitating Counterfactuals.Crawford L. Elder - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1-15.
    Historically, opponents of realism have managed to slip beneath a key objection which realists raise against them. The opponents say that some element of the world is constructed by our cognitive practices; realists retort that the element would have existed unaltered, had our practices differed; the opponents sometimes agree, contending that we construct in just such a way as to render the counterfactual true. The contemporary instalment of this debate starts with conventionalism about modality, which holds that the borders of (...)
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  11. Realism and Determinable Properties.Crawford L. Elder - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):149-159.
    The modern form of realism about properties has typically been far more austere than its Platonic ancestor. There is nothing especially austere about denying, as most modern property realists do, the reality of “disjunctive properties”—properties which would correspond, in the world, to disjunctive predicates such as “is an apple or an ocean,” “is observed by now and green or not observed by now and blue,” etc. But modern property realists typically deny far more. It has been argued, for example, that (...)
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  12.  56
    Conventionalism and Realism-Imitating Counterfactuals.Crawford L. Elder - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):1–15.
    Historically, opponents of realism have argued that the world’s objects are constructed by our cognitive activities—or, less colorfully, that they exist and are as they are only relative to our ways of thinking and speaking. To this realists have stoutly replied that even if we had thought or spoken in ways different from our actual ones, the world would still have been populated by the same objects as it actually is, or at least by most of them. (Our thinking differently (...)
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  13.  58
    A Different Kind of Natural Kind.Crawford L. Elder - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):516 – 531.
  14.  12
    Against Universal Mereological Composition.Crawford Elder - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):433-454.
    This paper opposes universal mereological composition. Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is a (...)
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  15.  27
    An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity.Crawford L. Elder - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):317-336.
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  16.  30
    Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds.Crawford L. Elder - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):425-444.
  17.  99
    Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.
    James decides that the best price today on pork chops is at Supermarket S, then James makes driving motions for twenty minutes, then James’ car enters the parking lot at Supermarket S. Common sense supposes that the stages in this sequence may be causally connected, and that the pattern is commonplace: James’ belief (together with his desire for pork chops) causes bodily behavior, and the behavior causes a change in James’ whereabouts. Anyone committed to the idea that beliefs and desires (...)
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  18.  47
    "Realism and the Problem of" Infimae Species".Crawford Elder - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):111 - 127.
    Modal conventionalism is the view that two crucial forms of sameness are mind-dependent. There is no phenomenon of sameness in kind, on this view, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating nature’s kinds; there is no phenomenon of numerical sameness across time, for an individual member of some natural kind, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating such members.1 Modal conventionalism has its realist opponents. These opponents have argued, following Kripke’s lead more than thirty years ago (Kripke 1972), (...)
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  19.  9
    Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):111-127.
    Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident or a coincidence and (...)
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  20.  22
    Realism and the Problem of "Infimae Species".Crawford Elder - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):111 - 127.
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  21. Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):332-43.
    A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...)
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  22. Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):317-331.
    Common sense believes in objects which, if real, routinely lose component parts or particles. Statues get chipped, people undergo haircuts and amputations, and ships have planks replaced. Sometimes philosophers argue that in addition to these objects, there are others which could not possibly lose any of their parts or particles, nor have new ones added to them--objects which could not possibly have been bigger or smaller, at any time, than how they actually were.1 (Sometimes the restriction on size is argued (...)
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  23.  6
    Laws, Natures, and Contingent Necessities.Crawford L. Elder - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):649-667.
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  24.  62
    On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132-155.
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
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  25.  64
    On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132–155.
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
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  26.  50
    Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
    We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, (...)
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  27.  84
    Destruction, Alteration, Simples and World Stuff.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):24–38.
    When a tree is chopped to bits, or a sweater unravelled, its matter still exists. Since antiquity, it has sometimes been inferred that nothing really has been destroyed: what has happened is just that this matter has assumed new form. Contemporary versions hold that apparent destruction of a familiar object is just rearrangement of microparticles or of 'physical simples' or 'world stuff'. But if destruction of a familiar object is genuinely to be reduced to mere alteration of something else, we (...)
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  28.  8
    Realism and Determinable Properties.Crawford L. Elder - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):149-159.
    The modern form of realism about properties has typically been far more austere than its Platonic ancestor. There is nothing especially austere about denying, as most modern property realists do, the reality of “disjunctive properties”—properties which would correspond, in the world, to disjunctive predicates such as “is an apple or an ocean,” “is observed by now and green or not observed by now and blue,” etc. But modern property realists typically deny far more. It has been argued, for example, that (...)
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  29.  14
    Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):317-331.
    How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties? If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue's borders, and the gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this "problem of coinciding objects", this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the piece and (...)
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  30.  72
    Ontology and Realism About Modality.Crawford L. Elder - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.
    To be a realist about modality, need one claim that more exists than just the various objects and properties that populate the world—e.g. worlds other than the actual one, or maximal consistent sets of propositions? Or does the existence of objects and properties by itself involve the obtaining of necessities (and possibilities) in re? The latter position is now unpopular but not unfamiliar. Aristotle held that objects have essences, and hence necessarily have certain properties. Recently it has been argued that (...)
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  31.  26
    Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):79 - 89.
  32.  58
    What Versus How in Naturally Selected Representations.Crawford L. Elder - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):349-363.
    Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological 'supposed to', we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide (...)
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  33.  9
    Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):332-343.
  34.  13
    Higher and Lower Essential Natures.Crawford L. Elder - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):255 - 265.
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  35.  40
    Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):332-343.
    A mutation alters the hemoglobin in some members of a species of antelope, and as a result the members fare better at high altitudes than their conspecifics do; so high-altitude foraging areas become open to them that are closed to their conspecifics; they thrive, reproduce at a greater rate, and the gene for altered hemoglobin spreads further through the gene pool of the species. That sounds like a classic example (owed to Karen Neander, 1995) of a causal chain traced by (...)
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  36.  5
    On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132-155.
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
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  37.  33
    On the Reality of Medium-Sized Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (2):191 - 211.
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  38.  68
    Materialism and the Mediated Causation of Behavior.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):165-175.
    Are judgements and wishes really brain events which will be affirmed by a completed scientific account of how human behavior is caused? Materialists, other than eliminativists, say Yes. But brain events do not cause muscle contractions, hence bodily movements, directly. They do so, if at all, by triggering intermediate causes, viz. firings in motor nerves. So it is crucial, this paper argues, whether they are characterized as biological events - performances of naturally-selected-for operations - or instead as complex microphysical events. (...)
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  39. Alexander's Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):163-171.
  40. Real Essentialism • by David S. Oderberg.Crawford L. Elder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):376-378.
    This book presents vigorous and wide-ranging arguments in defense of an Aristotelian metaphysical scheme along fairly orthodox Thomistic lines. The central claim is that the items that populate the world have real essences – natures that mind-independently define what each such item is. This Aristotelian essentialism, Oderberg begins by telling us, is a different doctrine from what has recently been called ‘essentialism’, and a more powerful one . For recent essentialism has treated a thing's essence as merely all those properties (...)
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  41. Persistence, Stage Theory And Speaking Loosely.Crawford Elder - 2010 - Annales Philosophici 1:18-29.
    .What are the truth-makers for the claims we make about the ways familiar objects persist across change?“Stage theory” has come to be recognized as an alternative to endurantism and perdurantism. It locates the truth-makers in properties possessed by momentary object-stages and in relations between suitably propertied objectstages. This paper argues that stage theory needs tightening up: momentary stages are too short to possess by themselves the requisite properties, and relations to other stages cannot remedy the defect. Fixing this problem requires (...)
     
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  42. The Problem of Harmonizing Laws.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):25 - 41.
    More laws obtain in the world,it appears, than just those of microphysics –e.g. laws of genetics, perceptual psychology,economics. This paper assumes there indeedare laws in the special sciences, and notjust scrambled versions of microphysical laws. Yet the objects which obey them are composedwholly of microparticles. How can themicroparticles in such an object lawfully domore than what is required of them by the lawsof microphysics? Are there additional laws formicroparticles – which seems to violate closureof microphysics – or is the ``more'' (...)
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  43.  3
    Natural Kinds.Crawford L. Elder - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):239-241.
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  44.  25
    Proper Functions Defended.Crawford L. Elder - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):167 - 171.
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  45.  35
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):177-178.
    This book stakes out a position in the area of metaphysics that deals with modality. But is this even a legitimate area of inquiry? Chapter 1 begins by confronting scepticism on this score. Some hold that the logical positivists sharpened “Hume’s fork”— either “relations of ideas” or “matters of fact”—and thereby discredited metaphysics in general. Others hold that Wittgenstein discredited the specific metaphysical position known as essentialism. But both readings of the record are mistaken, McLeod argues. Hume did not himself (...)
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  46.  12
    The Case Against Irrealism.Crawford L. Elder - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (3):239 - 253.
  47.  14
    Contrariety and "Carving Up Reality".Crawford L. Elder - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):277 - 289.
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  48. Undercutting the Idea of Carving Reality.Crawford L. Elder - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):41-59.
    It is widely supposed that, in Hilary Putnam’s phrase, there are no “ready-made objects” (Putnam 1982; cf. Putnam 1981, Ch. 3). Instead the objects we consider real are partly of our own making: we carve them out of the world (or out of experience). The usual reason for supposing this lies in the claim that there are available to us alternative ways of “dividing reality” into objects (to quote the title of Hirsch 1993), ways which would afford us every bit (...)
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  49.  80
    The Alleged Supervenience of Everything on Microphysics.Crawford L. Elder - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):87-95.
    Here is a view at least much like Lewis’s “Humean supervenience,” and in any case highly influential—in that some endorse it, and many more worry that it is true. All truths about the world are fixed by the pattern of instantiation, by individual points in space-time, of the “perfectly natural properties” posited by end-of-inquiry physics. In part, this view denies independent variability: the world could not have been different from how it actually is, in the ways depicted by common sense (...)
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  50.  54
    Anthropology and the Interpretation of Moral Beliefs.Crawford L. Elder - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):287-306.
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