Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch's Analogy

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (4):226-235 (2016)
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Abstract

In this note, I discuss David Enoch's influential deliberative indispensability argument for metanormative realism, and contend that the argument fails. In doing so, I uncover an important disanalogy between explanatory indispensability arguments and deliberative indispensability arguments, one that explains how we could accept the former without accepting the latter.

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Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):671-688.
Rorty’s Promise in Metaethics.Raff Donelson - 2017 - Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (3):292-306.
In Defense of Deliberative Indispensability.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):118-135.

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References found in this work

Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):529-536.

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