The nature of causation

Philosophy of Science 7 (2):192-204 (1940)
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Abstract

Strange as it may seem, the traditional principle of causality is based on two contradictory assumptions, both of which are generally accepted, explicitly or implicitly, by the contemporary physicists as well as philosophers. That they are not always willing to acknowledge this paradoxical fact, does not save them from the perplexing situation. The two assumptions, in brief, are: That nothing can act at a distance or across an interval of time, without something mediating between the bodies or events; and That every cause precedes its effect and may be located at a distance from it.

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