In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96 (1993)

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst
My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of a network of events.1 The second concerns the nature of causation, and the third concerns the conception of behavior. I try to vindicate a robust idea of mental causation
Keywords Causation  Mental  Metaphysics
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Global Supervenience and Dependence.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
Closing in on Causal Closure.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (1-2):96-109.

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