Possible worlds of doubt

Acta Analytica 25 (2):259-277 (2010)
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Abstract

A prominent contemporary anti-skeptical strategy, most famously articulated by Keith DeRose, aims to cage the skeptic′s doubts by contextualizing subjunctive conditional accounts of knowledge through a conversational rule of sensitivity. This strategy, I argue, courts charges of circularity by selectively invoking heavy counterfactual machinery. The reason: such invocation threatens to utilize a metric for modal comparison that is implicitly informed by judgments of epistemic sameness. This gives us reason to fear that said modal metric is selectively cherry-picked in advance to support the very anti-skeptical conclusion for which the contextualist longs.

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Ronald Wilburn
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Seguridad epistémica, convicción y escepticismo.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 56:139-154.
Why Dreaming Worlds aren’t Nearby Possible Worlds.James Simpson - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1226-1243.
I Know. Modal Epistemology and Scepticism.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):640-644.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.

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