Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledge

Analysis 64 (4):348-353 (2004)
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Abstract

I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes

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10.1093/analys/64.4.348

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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.
Refutation by elimination.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):35-39.
Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
A reply to my critics.George Edward Moore - 1942 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York,: Tudor Pub. Co..
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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