This chapter contains sections titled: Life Before the Fall A Short Pre‐History of the Absurd Camus's Absurd Problematic One Giant Leap Back, One Small Step Forward: the Problem of Meaning Camus's Existential Phenomenology Camus's Sisyphean Ethics The Myth of Sisyphus notes further reading.

The price for morality as the meaning of existence is the entrance of another kind of absurdity, a moral absurdity. Clearly, there is something absurd about life on The Good Place. Moral worth, both on The Good Place and in our real‐life existence, comes in degrees. Deontological views, most famously associated with Immanuel Kant, hold that the morality of an action is determined based on whether or not it adheres to a moral rule. Care requires being flexible in (...) different situations so as to best foster caring relationships with others. A care ethics approach would give some support to Eleanor's claims in The Good Place, insofar as a caring home life is essential to the development of the child in a variety of ways. The power of caring relationships is perhaps nowhere more salient than in the show's final few episodes. (shrink)

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...) on reflection they seem less meaningful than we suppose. Thomas Nagel claims that this discrepancy is inevitable, and thus that our lives are absurd and to be approached with irony. The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations (of Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, and others) of the old idea that we can transcend this absurdity by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut. (shrink)

Camus’ early philosophy has been subject to various kinds of criticism. In this paper I address a problem that has not been noticed so far, namely that it appears to be essentially inconsistent. On the one hand, Camus explicitly denies the existence of moral values, and construes his central notion of the absurd in a way that presupposes this denial. On the other hand, he is also committed to the existence of certain values. Both in his literary and philosophical works (...) Camus is not so much interested in the absurd per se, but rather in how we ought to respond to it. In justifying his supposed normative conclusions, he tacitly, but crucially, relies on evaluative judgements. If all this is true, then prospects for defenders of absurdism seem bleak. In whichever way the inconsistency is resolved, they will have to give up or significantly modify central parts of Camus’ early philosophy. But things may not stand quite as bad. As I try to show, there is a route to consistency that preserves much of Camus’ early philosophy, and leaves it prima facie plausible. The key is to re-interpret its normative aspects. Stated a bit provocatively, we need to put Camus in the self-help genre. (shrink)

La logique classique, qui repose sur trois principes fondamentaux (d'identité, de non-contradiction et de tiers-exclu), a pu séduire par son efficacité orientée vers l'être, elle permet d'appréhender la cohérence du réel, donc de développer les savoirs. Pour autant, sa puissance s'avère limitée dans certaines situations des limitations internes des formalismes à l'apparition de nouveaux objets paradoxaux, la science du XXe siècle a été confrontée à une crise de ses fondements dont elle n'est pas encore sortie. Or, s'affranchir de ce qui (...) vient en nous entraver la pensée a été un enjeu pour des courants soucieux de fonder leur rigueur démonstrative sur un au-delà de l'être. Dans la lignée de l'hénologie néoplatonicienne, ces modes d'explication ont néanmoins souvent été jugés irrationnels, mystiques ou simplement absurdes. À l'aide des logiques non standards contemporaines, c'est une étude systémique de ces positions qui est ici envisagée à travers la critique de l'hégémonie des trois grands principes logiques grâce à la logique intuitionniste, il devient possible de construire rigoureusement la notion de néant suressentiel; grâce aux logiques paraconsistantes, les contradictions et les paradoxes qu'une telle dialectique engendre perdent leur caractère irrationnel; enfin, grâce aux traditions logiques indiennes et japonaises, le principe d'identité peut lui-même être questionné. Cette remise en cause radicale de nos certitudes les mieux ancrées permet ultimement de dégager de nouvelles perspectives à la pensée logique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

PENULTIMATE DRAFT. At times, weird stories such as the Pizzagate spread surprisingly quickly and widely. In this paper I analyze the mental attitudes of those who seem to take those absurdities seriously: I argue that those stories are often imagined rather than genuinely believed. Then I make room for the claim that often these imaginings are used to support group ideologies. My main contribution is to explain how that support actually happens by showing that motivated cognition can employ imagination as (...) a seemingly rational tool to reinforce and protect beliefs. (shrink)

Книга обращена ко всем интересующимся современной философской проблематикой, методами и приемами мышления человека.

Dem Absurden ins Auge sehen - das ist eine Herausforderung, die mit Entzweiung, Entfremdung und demzufolge mit großer Anspannung und Anstrengung einhergeht. In solchen Momenten entgleitet uns die Welt und wir stehen, so Albert Camus, vor der alles entscheidenden Frage: Selbstmord oder Freiheit. Der vorliegende Band verhandelt Bedrohungen und Gefahren ebenso wie Potenziale und Freiheiten des Absurden. Stimmen aus Philosophie, Erziehungswissenschaft, Literatur, Kunst, Medizin und Wirtschaftswissenschaft machen dabei deutlich: Das Absurde betrifft uns alle.

Coming Back to the Absurd is a celebration of the enduring significance and impact of Albert Camus's first philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus. This collection of essays, from some of the world's leading Camus scholars, examines Camus's unique contribution to philosophy through The Myth since its publication.

Will appeal to thoughtful readers who ponder the "big question" of the meaning of life. It explores the question both in a philosophical way and through using classical and contemporary Jewish texts. Both philosophy and Judaism run into ineliminable doubt. This shared circumstance can promote honest dialogue.

Rational addiction theories illustrate how absurd choice theories in economics get taken seriously as possibly true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and based on wildly inaccurate assumptions selectively justified by ad-hoc stories. The lack of transparency introduced by poorly anchored mathematical models, the psychological persuasiveness of stories, and the way the profession neglects relevant issues are suggested as explanations for how what we perhaps should see as displays of technical skill and ingenuity are (...) allowed to blur the lines between science and games. (shrink)

Absurdist accounts of life’s meaning posit that life is absurd because our pretensions regarding its meaning conflict with the actual or perceived reality of the situation. Relationary accounts posit that contingent things gain their meaning only from their relationship to other meaningful things. I take a detailed look at the two types of account, and, proceeding under the assumption that they are correct, combine them to see what the implications of such a combination might be. I conclude that another way (...) of looking at the absurdity of life is to see it as a conflict between our dual beliefs that there exist intrinsically meaningful contingent things, and that contingent things may only gain their meaning extrinsically through their relationships to other meaningful things. In this way, I provide another lens through which feelings of life’s absurdity may be interpreted and analysed: as the conflict between the simultaneous beliefs in both intrinsically and relationally meaningful contingent things. Looking through this lens gives us an entirely different framework for analysing life’s absurdity than that which Nagel described in 1971, providing opportunity for more potential avenues of analysis and discussion. (shrink)

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Virginia and at Texas A&M University. I thank audiences at both institutions for their insightful comments. Special thanks to John Williams for his illuminating comments on an earlier draft. Research for this paper was supported in part by a Summer Grant from the Vice Provost for Research and Public Service at the University of Virginia. That support is here gratefully acknowledged.

This chapter looks to a “Husserlian-influenced” phenomenology to augment our understanding of one of the most significant—and open-ended—categories of theatre to emerge in the past century: the so-called Theatre of the Absurd. Here, Jodie McNeilly-Renaudie and Pierre-Jean Renaudie examine Beckett, SamuelEndgame to make an argument that the standing definitions of “absurdityabsurdity—grounded in Martin Esslin’s genesis of the term—are incomplete. The authors here argue that a consideration Husserl, Edmund differentiation between “two possible ways for meaning to be missing” demonstrates that the (...) very essence of theatrical absurdity involves not only a loss of meaning and the distress and fragmentation that such loss invokes, but, crucially, and in equal measure, the experience of such meaninglessness in terms of human endeavour to overcome it. (shrink)

In this article, I make an attempt to define terms such as: tragedy, absurdity, and paradox as conceived of by the German essayist Walter Hilsbecher. This is a task which is both difficult and interesting, mainly because of the fact that concepts from within speculative philosophy are relatively rarely subject to scrupulous definitions. The reason for this state of affairs lies in the difficulty to capture the meaning of these concepts within a rigid framework. These problems also appear in (...) Hilsbecher’s 1972 work titled Tragizm, absurd, paradoks [Tragedy, Absurd, Paradox]. The philosophy of the absurd – the methodological separation of which I propose – has the absurd for its central concept, but it is a concept which eludes sharp definitions, too. This article aims to reconstruct Hilsbecher’s vocabulary of concepts crucial to the philosophy of absurdity in reference to the tradition of contemporary speculative philosophy. By locating the German writer’s thought in the context of other authors working in a similar thematic and stylistic context, I will outline this specific strand of philosophy. (shrink)

A l'énigme proposée par l'expérience de la vie, il y a deux réponses possibles : "tout est absurde" ou "c'est un mystère".... Jean Guitton constate : "Pour chacun, absurde et mystère sont les deux pôles inverses entre lesquels oscille la pensée humaine. Quand chacun s'examine en profondeur, il écoute cette double voix. Mais, l'oscillation étant rejetée, pour moi l'absurdité de l'absurde me conduit vers le mystère.".

Ce livre que je présente à nouveau aujourd'hui, dans une édition qui évoque publiquement ses origines, n'a pas une histoire comme les autres. Jamais il n'aurait vu le jour sans une étonnante rencontre avec François Mitterrand, dans la Creuse, au début des années quatre-vingt, qui fut suivie d'autres entretiens. Une rencontre sur le ton de la confession, inhabituelle et directe, une conversation surprenante. Une sorte de dialogue contemporain entre celui qui penche vers l'absurde et celui qui croit au mystère. Ensemble, (...) nous reprenions l'éternel débat sur le sens de la vie et la destinée de l'homme. Mais, tous deux, nous mettions Dieu au centre de nos réflexions. J'ai pris conscience du mystère Mitterrand, des secrets de cet homme obsédé par la mort, l'au-delà, les fins dernières, la vie éternelle. Ce texte n'a pas vieilli, garde sa saveur de testament spirituel et dévoile une part de la personnalité de mon visiteur. Fruit du dialogue entre un philosophe et un politique, cet ouvrage reparaît donc plus d'un an après la mort de ce président qui continue d'habiter la mémoire des Français. A un moment où les Français eux-mêmes se posent des questions sur l'avenir et la religion. Puissent-ils trouver des réponses dans ce que j'ai dit au premier d'entre eux : François Mitterrand. (shrink)

Albert Camus is most famous for his engagement with the absurd. Both in his philosophical and literary works his main focus was on the nature and normative consequences of this idea. However, Camus was also concerned with what he referred to as the “feeling of the absurd”. Philosophers have so far paid little attention to Camus’ thoughts about the feeling of the absurd. In this paper I provide a detailed analysis of this feeling. It turns out that the feeling of (...) the absurd is not, strictly speaking, a feeling. It is rather a conjunction of a mood (feeling of the absurd in the narrow sense) and of emotions that this mood tends to give rise to (appearances of the feeling of the absurd). Moreover, both moods and emotions qualify as absurd in virtue of their promoting the discovery of the absurd; that is, the discovery that humans search for meaning, but the world does not answer this search. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence (...) of this argument, namely, that they should not believe their own brand of scientific antirealism. (shrink)

In A Confession, a memoir of his philosophical midlife crisis, Tolstoy recounts falling into despair after coming to believe that his life, and for that matter all human life, is meaningless and absurd. Although Tolstoy's account of the origin and phenomenology of his crisis is widely regarded as illuminating, his response to the crisis, namely, embracing a religious tradition that he had previously dismissed as “irrational,” “incomprehensible,” and “mingled with falsehood” seems unpromising, at best. Nevertheless, I argue, Tolstoy's account of (...) his response makes a valuable contribution to contemporary thought about the meaning and absurdity of life. I begin by drawing on classic discussions in the philosophical literature, and on Tolstoy's memoir, in order to characterize the problem of meaning and the problem of the absurd, and to clarify the relation between these problems. I then draw on Tolstoy's account of his response to his crisis in order to characterize a form of faith in our deepest values. I argue that such faith supplies one important part of the story concerning how we might respond to the problem of the absurd — a part that has been overlooked by more recent discussions of these issues. (shrink)

Belliotti unravels the paradoxes of human existence to reveal paths for crafting meaningful, significant, valuable, even important lives. He argues that human life is not inherently absurd; examines the implications of mortality; contrasts subjective and objective meaning, and evaluates contemporary renderings of meaningful human lives.

The subject of the study is the connection between the absurd and phenomenology.The texts of representatives of the absurdist trend in literature and philosophy (Camus, Kafka, Musil), as well as the works of academic philosophers of the phenomenological direction (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) are considered. The commonality of phenomenological interpretations of reality for some texts of the absurdist genre is proved. As a hypothesis, the existence of an epistemological dimension of meaning in the works of the absurd is put forward, (...) interpreted by the author as a reception of the views of phenomenologists, problematized in the inconsistent reduction of phenomena. The methodological basis was the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as the critical analysis of the text. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to present phenomenology as a precursor of absurdism, connected with it through the sphere of axiology. The main contribution of the author is the actualization of the epistemological layer of such a multifaceted phenomenon as the absurd, namely, the elaboration of the hypothesis that in many works of absurdists, the metamorphoses of the characters' consciousness are in fact an inconsistent reduction consisting in explicit metamorphoses of the Ego, as well as violating subject-object relations but not actually bracketing the idea of the world. Many literary contemporaries of Husserl devote their thoughts to the problems of phenomenology to one degree or another, which makes the connection between absurd literature and the key theses of early phenomenology logical. (shrink)

21세기는 ‘분노의 시대’이다. 현대 자본주의 사회에서 개인의 높아진 기대를 충족시킬 수 없는 냉혹한 현실로 인해 좌절하는 사람들의 분노 지수가 증가하고 있다. 이러한 경향은 1980년대부터 2000년대 초반 출생한 ‘한국의 MZ세대’에게서 극명하게 나타난다. 이에 본 논문은 분노가 한국 사회의 고질적인 문제이겠지만 유독 MZ세대에게 두드러진 현상임에 주목하고, 그 원인이 무엇인지 살펴본 뒤, 분노를 넘어선 새로운 삶의 시작이 어떻게 가능한지에 대해 논의한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 부조리의 문제에 천착했던 알베르 카뮈(A. Camus)의 철학을 통해 ‘부조리’가 무엇인지 그 핵심적 논의를 먼저 고찰하고, 부조리를 경험하는 MZ세대가 왜 (...) 분노하는지 그들이 처한 경제·사회·문화적 환경과 그들만의 의식 구조를 통해 그 원인을 간단히 규명한다. 이러한 규명을 바탕으로 본 논문은 어떻게 그들이 부조리로 인한 분노를 감당할 수 있는지, 그 내면의 힘을 강화할 수 있는 철학상담의 방법을 카뮈 철학의 주요 개념인 자유, 열정, 사랑을 포괄하는 ‘반항’ 개념을 통해 제시하고 있다. (shrink)

Camus’ notions of absurdity and revolt remain relevant today, especially with respect to very recent developments in the growing role of electronic and digital mass media. Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel The Road , describing a father and child’s journey after the world as we know it has been destroyed, is used to highlight the nature of absurdity and revolt in their updated early 21 st century version.

This paper seeks to provide a renewed meaning to the idea of truth by enclosing it within Gandhi’s rhetorical use of the term religion. The religion that he seeks to present to us as Hinduism is absurd on all fronts, it is argued here. It is through such absurdity that he infuses notions of validity and obeyance on his own terms to take us to profuse criticisms of not only colonial but civilizational modernity as well. Further a newer meaning (...) is given to Hinduism in a rather unexpected manner even in the context of the Indian national movement. The point about political conservatism, the element of exoticism and God takes us to adventures around truth by a thinker-activist speaking as a colonial subject. (shrink)

Joseph Heath lumps in quotas and protectionist measures with cartelization, taking advantage of information asymmetries, seeking a monopoly position, and so on, as all instances of behavior that can lead to market failures in his market failures approach to business ethics. The problem is that this kind of rent and rent seeking, when they fail to deliver desirable outcomes, are better described as government failure. I suggest that this means we will have to expand Heath’s framework to a market and (...) government failures approach. I then try to defuse objections that as a government failure, rent seeking may not appear relevant to what managers ought to do. Solving this conceptual issue will also give us an excuse to revisit a separate conceptual issue: the normatively thick conception of “rent” and rent seeking behavior that some use. This normatively thick conception is problematic, I argue, and I offer the beginnings of a novel, normatively neutral conception that is useful for our purposes in making the ethics of rent and rent seeking behavior more than a merely trivial exercise. (shrink)

The opening argument in the Metaphysics M.2 series targeting separate mathematical objects has been dismissed as flawed and half-hearted. Yet it makes a strong case for a point that is central to Aristotle’s broader critique of Platonist views: if we posit distinct substances to explain the properties of sensible objects, we become committed to an embarrassingly prodigious ontology. There is also something to be learned from the argument about Aristotle’s own criteria for a theory of mathematical objects. I hope to (...) persuade readers of Metaphysics M.2 that Aristotle is a more thoughtful critic than he is often taken to be. (shrink)

The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting 'p' normally expresses a belief that p. Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of belief that p, is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p, is logically possible, but inconsistent. A possible source of confusion between (...) 'impossible' and 'inconsistent' is the fact that a proposition which is inconsistent tout court is always self-contradictory and hence necessarily false, unlike one which is inconsistent with other propositions. Whereas the proposition Ibp&-Ibp is inconsistent, the proposition IBp &IB-p is not. I cannot hold a belief which I lack, but I can.. (shrink)

What are we to make of works of art whose apparent point is to convince us of the meaninglessness and absurdity of human existence? I examine, in this paper, the attempt of Albert Camus to provide philosophical justification of art in the face of the supposed fact of absurdity and note its failure as such with specific reference to Sartre’s criticism. Despite other superficial similarities, I contrast Camus’s concept of the absurd with that of his ‘existentialist’ colleagues, including (...) Sartre, and suggest that the latter concept is more philosophically viable. I conclude that existential phenomenology consequently provides a more promising philosophical justification for artistic creation in the light of the more viable conception of absurdity. (shrink)

John Broome and Duncan Foley have argued that it is a ‘misperception’ that the ‘control of global warming is costly’ and that we can make ‘sacrifices unnecessary’. There are a number of assumptions that are essential for this idea to work. These assumptions can be challenged. Furthermore, my claim is not merely that the Broome/Foley argument is flawed, and therefore unlikely to be successful. I will argue that it is potentially harmful, leading to harms for the present generation and for (...) future generations. (shrink)

It was shown in the previous work of the author that one can avoid the paradox of minimal logic { ϕ , ¬ ϕ } ¬ ψ defining the negation operator via reduction not a constant of absurdity, but to a unary operator of absurdity. In the present article we study in details what does it mean that negation in a logical system can be represented via an absurdity or contradiction operator. We distinguish different sorts of such (...) presentations. Finally, we consider the possibility to represent the negation via absurdity and contradiction operators in such well known systems of paraconsistent logic as D.Batens's logic CLuN and Sette's logic P 1. (shrink)

Camus’ central thesis in The Myth of Sisyphus is that suicide is not the proper response to, nor is it the solution of, the problem of absurdity. Yet many of his literary protagonists either commit suicide or are self-destructive in other ways. I argue that the protagonists that best live up to the characteristics of the absurd man that Camus outlines in the Myth uniformly either commit suicide or consent to their destruction by behaving in such a manner as (...) to invite death. It is my contention that this raises serious questions abuut the validity of Camus’ arguments that suicide is not the proper response to the recognition that life is absurd. (shrink)

Camus’ central thesis in The Myth of Sisyphus is that suicide is not the proper response to, nor is it the solution of, the problem of absurdity. Yet many of his literary protagonists either commit suicide or are self-destructive in other ways. I argue that the protagonists that best live up to the characteristics of the absurd man that Camus outlines in the Myth uniformly either commit suicide or consent to their destruction by behaving in such a manner as (...) to invite death. It is my contention that this raises serious questions abuut the validity of Camus’ arguments that suicide is not the proper response to the recognition that life is absurd. (shrink)

The position advocated in the target article should be called “absurd environmentalism.” Literature showing that general intelligence is related to musical ability is not cited. Also ignored is the heritability of musical talent. Retrospective studies supporting practice over talent are incapable of showing differences in talent, because subjects are self-selected on talent. Reasons for the popularity of absurd environmentalism are discussed.

In "The Myth of Sisyphus", Camus recommends scornful defiance in the face of our absurd, meaningless existence. Although Nagel agrees that human life possesses an absurd dimension, he objects to Camus' existentialist 'dramatics'. For Nagel, absurdity arises from the irreducible tension between our subjective and objective perspectives on life. In this paper I do two things: (i) critically reconstruct Camus' and Nagel's positions, and (ii) develop Nagel's critique of Camus in order to argue that humour is an appropriate response (...) to absurdity. (shrink)

Why do well‐functioning psychological systems sometimes give rise to absurd beliefs that are radically misaligned with reality? Drawing on signalling theory, I develop and explore the hypothesis that groups often embrace beliefs that are viewed as absurd by outsiders as a means of signalling ingroup commitment. I clarify the game‐theoretic and psychological underpinnings of this hypothesis, I contrast it with similar proposals about the signalling functions of beliefs, and I motivate several psychological and sociological predictions that could be used to (...) distinguish it from alternative explanations of irrational group beliefs. (shrink)

On the basis of observations J. J. C. Smart once made concerning the absurdity of sentences like 'The seat of the bed is hard', a plausible case can be made that there is little point to developing a theory of types, particularly one of the sort envisaged by Fred Sommers. The authors defend such theories against this objection by a partial elucidation of the distinctions between the concepts of spanning and predicability and between category mistakenness and absurdity in (...) general. The argument suggests that further clarification of the concepts of spanning and category mistakenness should be sought in reflection upon the more familiar concepts of a sort of thing and a predicate category. (shrink)