Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):432-452 (2019)
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Abstract

Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self-knowledge of the reason-responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first-personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating Pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First-person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one’s point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self-understanding.

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Author's Profile

Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

Listening to algorithms: The case of self‐knowledge.Casey Doyle - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
Aiding self-knowledge.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1104-1121.
How to commit to commissive self‐knowledge.Benjamin Winokur - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):210-223.

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Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.

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