Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):432-452 (2019)

Authors
Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton
Abstract
Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self-knowledge of the reason-responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first-personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating Pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First-person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one’s point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self-understanding.
Keywords self-knowledge  testimony  value of knowledge  self-consciousness  first-person authority
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12268
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
First Person Authority.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2‐3):101-112.
Intention.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (1):110.
II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.

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Citations of this work BETA

Aiding Self-Knowledge.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1104-1121.

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