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Reflections on Inquiry and Truth arising from Peirce's Method for the Fixation of Belief
In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Peirce. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 87--126 (2004)
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Citations of this work
Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.
Fallibilism and the Aim of Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):1 - 22.
The inaugural address: Fallibilism and the aim of inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):1–22.
Truth and the Limits of Ethical Thought: Reading Wittgenstein with Diamond.Gilad Nir - 2023 - In Jens Pier (ed.), Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. Routledge.
Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.
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