Abstract

The central thesis of my dissertation is that theories of the justification of legal punishment should take into account the effects of punishment on the characters of offenders and society as a whole. I maintain that punishments should not "make people worse" by damaging the characters of offenders or those who administer punishments, a concern that is especially acute in the case of incarceration. This project contributes to the understanding of the ethics of punishment by illuminating some of the moral costs of punishment that have been overlooked by philosophical justifications of punishment and by extending the scope of punishment theory beyond standard concerns about proportionate retribution and effective deterrence. ;The philosophical task of my dissertation is to provide a plausible account of the role of character as part of a broader conceptual framework within which theories of punishment are elaborated. I argue that although it is an important feature of the Anglo-American legal tradition that punishments be administered for deeds, and not for bad motives or vices, concerns about character are relevant to the severity and type of punishments that are justifiable. I propose that to the greatest extent possible, punishments should minimize damage to the characters of all those affected by them. I claim that such a character constraint on punishment is justified on the intuitive basis that some kinds of punitive treatment are incompatible with the value of human dignity. Further, I contend that because certain virtues of character like self-respect and a sense of justice are integral to sustaining just social and political institutions, punishments that severely harm these capacities are inconsistent with widely acknowledged principles of justice. I do not defend a comprehensive or even partial justification of punishment, nor do I conclude that acknowledging the value of character should lead us to abolish or dismantle all of our institutions of punishment. I argue that although a concern with character may conflict with certain approaches to the justification of punishment, many utilitarians and retributivists can adopt a character constraint on punishment without seriously compromising their theories