Fallacies in the Phaedo Again

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (2):121-134 (1995)
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Abstract

Keyt's analysis of the argument for the imperishability of the soul at _Phaedo (102a-107b10) as well as the author's Plato relies on a causal likeness inference, 'Because of x, F's are F; so x is F'. However, for Keyt the inference occurs at the metaphysical level, so to speak: 'because of some immanent character x, living things are alive so x is alive'. Here x is of the wrong logical type to be predicatively alive. On the author's view, however, the inference occurs at a lower level: 'because of souls, first level individuals that are the subjects of psychological states, living things are alive; so souls are alive'. Here it is still logically possible that souls are predicatively alive. But Plato has not shown that they are. At most he has shown that souls, being predicatively whatever they are, are also by nature eminently alive in Descartes's sense, i.e., are predicatively whatever it takes for them to make living things live

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Cass Weller
University of Washington

Citations of this work

Causation in the phaedo.Sean Kelsey - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):21–43.

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