Cass Weller
University of Washington
Keyt's analysis of the argument for the imperishability of the soul at _Phaedo (102a-107b10) as well as the author's Plato relies on a causal likeness inference, 'Because of x, F's are F; so x is F'. However, for Keyt the inference occurs at the metaphysical level, so to speak: 'because of some immanent character x, living things are alive so x is alive'. Here x is of the wrong logical type to be predicatively alive. On the author's view, however, the inference occurs at a lower level: 'because of souls, first level individuals that are the subjects of psychological states, living things are alive; so souls are alive'. Here it is still logically possible that souls are predicatively alive. But Plato has not shown that they are. At most he has shown that souls, being predicatively whatever they are, are also by nature eminently alive in Descartes's sense, i.e., are predicatively whatever it takes for them to make living things live
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/agph.1995.77.2.121
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,089
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Causation in the Phaedo.Sean Kelsey - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):21–43.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
42 ( #267,665 of 2,499,007 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #421,180 of 2,499,007 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes