Self-Supporting Strategies and Equilibria in Games

American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):323 - 336 (1999)
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Abstract

A strategic equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are each self-supporting given the profile. Strategic equilibria exist in games without Nash equilibria.

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

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