Abstract

Experience of something strange does not mean there is a strange thing that becomes experienced but rather it means that something is experienced as being strange. The same holds true for recognizing a stranger; the person recognized is not by herself a stranger but she becomes recognized as such. Thus, the denomination strange/stranger depends on the process of experience and recognition. Waldenfels has shown that experience is much more than simply an intentional act; it befalls a person who in experiencing something reacts to a claim that comes from outside and that can never be answered entirely. Therefore, experience has some elements of strangeness in its own structure. It is these elements that allow something or someone to be experienced as being strange. However, what exactly is experienced as being strange greatly depends on the particular situation as well as on previous experiences. In this paper I thus argue that the experience of strangeness correlates with the history of previous experiences. Since cultures mainly are characterized by a common history of experiences, what counts as being strange differs from culture to culture. An Intercultural Philosophy, therefore, would have to go beyond the analysis of an experience of strangeness by itself experiencing interculturality