Abstract

This essay examines the epistemology of evaluative, and especially moral, thinking, and attempts an analysis of value-concepts. It proposes an account according to which sentiment plays a central role in all rational evaluative thinking. But this account diverges sharply from traditional emotivism: it insists that rational evaluative thinking must be principled; it defends the pursuit of systematic moral theory through seeking reflective equilibrium; and, though committed to holding that value-judgments can be straightforwardly true, it is compatible with many metaphysical positions about the nature of evaluative truth, ranging from subjectivism to non-reductive realism about values. ;First, a general conception of epistemology and conceptual analysis is articulated. A philosophical study of a concept should offer a non-circular account of what it is to grasp the concept; and grasp of a concept involves mastery of the basic rules for forming rational beliefs involving the concept. ;Value-concepts, it is proposed, are essentially practical. This implies internalism: value-judgments are essentially connected to an actual or imagined motivation to act accordingly. To avoid circularity, such an internalist account must assign an evidential role in evaluative thinking to emotions or sentiments. ;As guides to evaluative truth, sentiments are highly fallible. But one can counteract this fallibility only by constructing a set of general principles, through seeking reflective equilibrium on the basis of one's sentiments, and thereby simultaneously refining both one's sentiments and one's value-judgments. ;According to this account, rational evaluative thinking is principled reliance on sentiment A discussion of the emotions shows that this account of value-concepts is not circular; and it is indicated how the metaphysical questions, about what it is for value-judgments to be true, could be resolved. ;Moral judgments differ from other value-judgments in demanding, not just theoretical agreement about what is true, but practical agreement about what is to be done; and moral sentiments stem from a capacity to respond emotionally to facts about people's interests regardless of how exactly one is related to those interests oneself. Finally, various sceptical challenges to our moral capacities are considered