Thinking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood on 'Ought'

Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):133-144 (2010)


Ralph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to ___'. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that 'the intentional is normative'. I argue, first, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood's account leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance

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