Conceptual role semantics for moral terms

Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30 (2001)
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Abstract

This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding this "conceptual role semantics" approach as preferable to noncognitivism, the causal theory of reference, and noncircular conceptual analysis.

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2009-01-28

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Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
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References found in this work

Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.
The right and the good.Judith Thomson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (6):273-298.
Can Possession Conditions Individuate Concepts?Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):433-460.
Can possession conditions individuate concepts? [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):433-460.

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