Classical Quarterly 32 (1):100-113 (1982)

There is no general agreement among scholars that Aristotle had a unified concept of phantasia. That is evident from the most cursory glance through the literature. Freudenthal speaks of the contradictions into which Aristotle seems to fall in his remarks about phantasia, and explains the contradictions as due to the border position which phantasia occupies between Wahrnehmung and thinking. Ross, in Aristotle , p. 143, talks of passages on phantasia in De Anima 3. 3 which constitute ‘a reversal of his doctrine of sensation’ and perhaps do not ‘represent his deliberate view’. This is a serious state of affairs, since De Anima 3. 3 is Aristotle’s main discussion of phantasia. Of passages on phantasia, appearances and images in De Anima 3. 3, Hamlyn says: ‘There is clearly little consistency here’. Even Schofield, who is more optimistic about saving the unity of Aristotle’s concept than the last two scholars, grants that ‘some of the inconsistencies of Aristotle’s account seem more than merely apparent’.1 He thinks of Aristotle’s phantasia as a ‘loose-knit, family concept’ . My purpose here is to suggest that Aristotle is more consistent in his use of phantasia than his critics will allow him to be. The translation of the term as imagination frequently adds unnecessarily to the confusion, so I shall avoid it and use transliteration instead
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References found in this work BETA

Aristotle's De Motu Animalium.D. W. Hamlyn - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):246.
Plato's Theory of Knowledge.Norman Gulley - 1962 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 18 (1):94-95.
Aristotle and Plato on "Appearing".K. Lycos - 1964 - Mind 73 (292):496-514.

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Citations of this work BETA

Pleasure, Tragedy and Aristotelian Psychology.Elizabeth Belfiore - 1985 - Classical Quarterly 35 (02):349-.
Pleasure, Tragedy and Aristotelian Psychology.Elizabeth Belfiore - 1985 - Classical Quarterly 35 (2):349-361.
A teoria hegeliana da imaginação.Hector Ferreiro - 2016 - Ágora Filosófica 16 (1):139-154.
On What Ontology is and Not-Is.Karin Verelst - 2008 - Foundations of Science 13 (3):347-370.

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