Robust intuition? Exploring the difference in the strength of intuitions from perspective of attentional bias

Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):169-194 (2024)
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Abstract

The logical intuition hypothesis proposes a difference in the strength between logical and heuristic intuitions. The labels of logical and heuristic intuitions are exclusive to conventional reasoning research. This paper reports the result of testing intuition strength using the dot-probe methodology in a novel multiplication paradigm. Here, “logical intuition” and “heuristic intuition” were relabeled as “weaker intuition” (-1 × 5 = 5) and “stronger intuition” (1 × 5 = 5), respectively, to assess the assumptions about the difference in the strength of “Chinese multiplication mnemonics” intuitions. The dot-probe paradigm was utilized in the following experiments to measure attentional bias. This was assessed by calculating the difference in reaction time between incongruent (the target location is opposite to the probe location) and congruent (the target location is the same as the probe location) conditions. Experiment 1 found attentional bias directed attention to the correct answer for both weaker and stronger intuitions. Experiment 2 replicated and extended Experiment 1 with a secondary task to manipulate high and low cognitive loads. Consequently, stronger intuitions were unaffected by cognitive load and participants were biased toward the correct answer, whereas attentional bias for weaker intuitions only occurred in low load conditions. These results revealed that although both intuitions can guide attention, stronger intuition may guide attention bias in a high-load situation due to its robust automation. Our findings extend the logical intuition hypothesis that proposes a difference in the automated strengths of intuitions to mathematical and analytic thinking.

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