Abstract

This dissertation presents an interpretation of Hegel's concept of the absolute Idea and its relation to philosophical speculation, based primarily on Hegel's central systematic work, the Science of Logic . ;I argue that Hegel developed his theory of the Absolute in conjunction with speculation about the logical Idea, i.e. his theory of categories and pure forms of thought. This means that Hegel conceived the truth and essence of the real strictly in terms of the categorial self-development of the eternal and absolute Idea. Reality, therefore, is in truth nothing but the Idea's self-movement, its self-relation of thinking and being thought; such a self-relation defines reality as ideality--constituted by the self-thinking Idea. ;But if Hegel's thesis concerning the ontological identity of metaphysics and logic is correct, then there arises a problem of the philosophical justification of such an identity claim: for if, in fact, there is no difference, neither logical nor ontological, between philosophical thought and the self-thinking Idea, then how do we as finite subjects ever attain objective criteria of legitimacy for these idealist claims? ;In this light, I argue that Hegel was fully aware of this dilemma of absolute reflection and, moreover, that he began to formulate a solution in his late theory of religion . His lectures on "Proofs for the Existence of God" constitute a programmatic argument which, it is hoped, will demonstrate speculative logic's objective identity with the Absolute on the basis of the essence of religious experience. And the essence of religious experience, Hegel argues, is the self-negating movement of finite spirit, its spiritual elevation to God. ;I conclude by arguing that Hegel's final understanding of his theory of the absolute Idea, as the single adequate object of philosophical thought, entails the unity of religious transcendence with speculative metaphysics; yet by assuming that religious experience was a necessary element in philosophical consciousness, Hegel's theory will inevitably fail to convince within a culture that no longer shares such a presupposition