Intencionalidad, libre albedrío y acción racional: un acercamiento a las posturas de John Searle y Anthony Kenny

Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38):89-102 (2011)
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Abstract

Resumen El presente trabajo pretende revisar el concepto de intencionalidad de John Searle a la luz de la noción de objetividad de García-Carpintero así como la concepción de libre arbitrio que de dicho concepto podría llegar a desprenderse. Asimismo, y con el fin de esclarecer qué podría entenderse por acción voluntaria nos valdremos de algunos comentarios hechos por Kenny en los cuales el autor intenta explicar qué es exactamente eso que solemos llamar una acción racional. Palabras clave:  intencionalidad; objetividad;libre arbitrio;acción voluntaria; acción racional. Intentionality, Free Will and Rational Action: an Approach to John Searle and Anthony Kenny’s stancesThis paper aims to review John Searle’s concept of intentionality in the light of Garcia Carpintero’s notion of objectivity, as well as the conception of free will which might come to be a consequence of the latter concept. Likewise, in order to clarify what might be understood as voluntary action, we will resort to some comments made by Kenny, in which the author attempts to explain what a rational action exactly is. Keywords : Intentionality; Objectivity; Free Will; Voluntary Action;Rational Action

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Miguel Vásquez
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

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