Über Wahrnehmung von Aspekten

Grazer Philosophische Studien 2 (1):67-83 (1976)
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Abstract

Unter the general heading of 'as-experiences' (to see X as Y) a distinction is drawn between epistemologically neutral (N-experiences) and epistemologically bound (B-experiences). N- and B-experiences move across the scale of O- and S-experiences; the distinction between 0- and S-experiences is a distinction in degree with regard to the subject's involvement in as-experiences. Constitutive and non-constitutive aspects are distinguished, and a conceptual connection is shown between constitutive aspects of an object and Rylean categories.

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