Synthese 160 (3):313-333 (2008)

Authors
Alyscia Smith
University of British Columbia
Abstract
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short, it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality
Keywords Husserl  Externalism  Disjunctivism  Reality  Horizon  Intentionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9082-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.

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